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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this Article is to explain new horizons and per-
spectives in international economic law in the context of sustaina-
ble development.  This Article explores the potential of the trading 
system in helping mitigate climate change and enhancing sustain-
able energy.  The argument is that trade agreements have tremen-
dous potential to help mitigate climate change, which is currently 
underexplored.  The Article explains how trade agreements may be 
a legal instrument to mitigate climate change and enhance sustain-
able energy.  It then provides an analysis of the challenges of miti-
gating climate change and enhancing sustainable energy.  Next, it 
examines the synergistic links between the trading and climate re-
gimes and offers forum options that best deal with them with the 
aim of helping to mitigate climate change and enhance sustainable 
energy.  The Article ends with what the future may hold on the 
links between international trade and renewable energy.    
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a lot of talk about the fact that, as a result of trade, we 
have increased social inequality,1 nationally and internationally, 
and that the level of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas 
(“GHG”) emissions has been going up over time, also a result of 
international trade,2 and what can be done about it.3  Trade is, in 
many senses, considered to be the competitor of environmental 
protection.  In this Article, however, I argue that, while all of that 
may be true, trade can contribute to climate change mitigation.   
Climate change is one of the biggest challenges humanity faces 
today.4  Today, 80% of the global energy supply comes from fossil 
                                                   
1  See WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL RISKS REPORT 2017, (12th ed. 2017), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GRR17_Report_web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H446-9MVY] (discussing how overall globalization and trade 
have reduced global inequality, although the unequal distribution of these bene-
fits remains a risk factor).  Regarding arguments on the correlation between trade 
liberalization, on the one hand, and climate change and inequity, on the other, nei-
ther of these problems seems to be driven by economics or the trading system.  
For instance, trade makes every country richer.  But it is not for the WTO to de-
cide who individually (as citizens) gets how much from the benefits of trade.  That 
is for national governments to decide based on national taxation.  See generally 
CHRIS HUGHES, FAIR SHOT: RETHINKING INEQUALITY AND HOW WE EARN (2018) (dis-
cussing income inequality and arguing for a tax on the top one percent of earners 
to guarantee income for working people).   
2  See Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Is Trade Good or Bad for 
the Environment?, http://www.oecd.org/trade/tradeandenvironment.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4VXK-KTWC] (weighing the benefits of a greater ability to 
manage the environment due to trade against the negatives of increased green-
house gas emissions); see also Envtl. Goods and Serv. Sector, EUROPA: EUROSTAT, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/environment/environmental-goods-and-
services-sector [https://perma.cc/5R27-B7FH] (indicating that “the purpose of 
environmental goods and services is to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution 
and any other form of environmental degradation . . . and to conserve and main-
tain the stock of natural resources, hence safeguarding against depletion.”).   
3  Some policy suggestions include a tax on the carbon content of imports and 
a refund of the tax to companies when they export, as the EU is doing with ce-
ment.  See Externalities: The Lives of Others, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 19, 2017), at 61.  
Others have studied the effects of a tax policy on GHG emissions.  See generally 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, EFFECTS OF U.S. TAX POLICY ON GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS (William D. Nordhaus et al. eds., 2013), 
https://smarterfuelfuture.org/assets/content/NRC_GHG_-_July_2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KV9R-392U] (reviewing tax provisions and their effects on 
carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions).   
4  See How Do We Know That Humans are the Major Cause of Global Warming?, 
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://www.ucsusa.org/global-
warming/science-and-impacts/science/human-contribution-to-gw-
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fuels.5  Fossil fuels contribute to climate change and are finite,6 
which leads to energy insecurity.7  Renewable energy can help here 
in that it is cleaner than fossil fuels.  It also helps towards energy 
independence and therefore enhances energy security.8  Trade law 
could be used as a vehicle to achieve this goal.  Trade can help eve-
ryone lift their living standards by aligning international stand-
ards.  Examples of this line of thinking are the policies of Canada, 
whose trade agreements include strict standards for labor rights 
and the environment.  The European Union (“EU”) has the same 
view and concluded the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement with Canada in 2016.  Other countries such as China,9 
however, want to keep trade deals just to trade issues, avoiding 
non-economic issues in trade agreements such as labor rights, equi-
ty, social welfare, and environmental protection.10   
                                                                                                                   
faq.html#.WiQcnEx2vIU [https://perma.cc/ZZ5W-PQHN] (outlining the evi-
dence to support that humans are the main driver of climate change).   
5  See Press Release, World Energy Council, World Energy Council Report Con-
firms Global Abundance of Energy Resources and Exposes Myth of Peak Oil (Oct. 15, 
2015), https://www.worldenergy.org/news-and-media/press-releases/world-
energy-council-report-confirms-global-abundance-of-energy-resources-and-
exposes-myth-of-peak-oil/ [https://perma.cc/5ZK6-8LNL] (noting that current 
estimates of energy reserves indicate an abundance of resources).   
6  But see MEGHAN L. O’SULLIVAN, WINDFALL: HOW THE NEW ENERGY 
ABUNDANCE UPENDS GLOBAL POLITICS AND STRENGTHENS AMERICA’S POWER (2017) 
(arguing that fears of energy scarcity have given way to the reality of energy 
abundance).   
7  See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY [IEA], CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion: High-
lights (2017), 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/CO2Emissionsf
romFuelCombustionHighlights2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/CCE6-3W6V] (re-
viewing global CO2 emissions from fuel combustion).   
8  See Aleh Cherp & Jessica Jewell, The Concept of Energy Security: Beyond the 
Four As, 75 ENERGY POL’Y 415, 421 (2014) (examining a new conception of energy 
security as “low vulnerability of vital energy systems”); see also Muhammad Asif 
& Tariq Muneer, Energy Supply, Its Demand and Security Issues for Developed and 
Emerging Economies, 11 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 1388, 1413 (2007) 
(assessing the current and future energy situation by evaluating five countries 
with prominent roles in the energy scene).   
9  Interestingly, China’s One Belt One Road Initiative, a massive infrastruc-
ture project, will have significant impacts on the energy market, with climate-
related consequences.  What is China’s One Belt, One Road?, BBC NEWS (May 12, 
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/av/business-39881895/what-is-china-s-one-
belt-one-road [https://perma.cc/MM7J-GWKA] (explaining China’s One Belt, 
One Road policy).   
10  It is interesting to note the separationist approach of mainstream econom-
ics, which has mainly focused on efficiency to the detriment of equity and sus-
tainability considerations.  Such an approach has been heavily criticized by Her-
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/3
 2018] New Frontiers of International Economic Law 87 
 
I argue that trade agreements can help mitigate climate change.  
In the past, they have been a very powerful instrument for change, 
as the following two examples demonstrate:   
 
1. poverty reduction:11  due to trade agreements,12 one billion 
people have come out of poverty between 1990 and 2010;13 
                                                                                                                   
man Daly in his prolific work.  See H. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Beacon Press (1997); Daly, H.E., Against Free Trade: 
Neoclassical and Steady-state Perspectives, 5 J. EVOL. ECON. 313 (1995). 
11  See, e.g., Ram Upendra Das, Regional Trade-FDI-Poverty Alleviation Linkages 
in REGIONAL INTEGRATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 149 
(Ulrich Volz ed., 2011) (exploring the linkages between trade, foreign direct in-
vestment, and poverty reduction); Masato Hayashikawa, Trading Out of Poverty: 
How Aid for Trade Can Help, Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev. [OECD] (2008), 
https://www.oecd.org/site/tadpd/41231150.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5WB-
DUXY] (discussing the various ways in which trade can be a tool for poverty re-
duction); Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Trade for Growth and Poverty 
Reduction: How Aid for Trade Can Help, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264098978-
en [https://perma.cc/43CC-BQ7A] (noting that aid-for-trade programs have a 
high potential to alleviate poverty); U.N. COMM’N ON TRADE & DEV., TRADE, 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND POVERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A SURVEY, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/OSG/DP/2012/1 (2012), 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/osgdp20121_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WQ4D-QVT9] (surveying the effects of trade and trade liberal-
ization on poverty); U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, RETHINKING POVERTY: 
REPORT ON THE WORLD SOCIAL SITUATION 2010, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/324, U.N. Sales 
No. E.09.IV.10 (2009) (exploring new strategies to alleviate poverty); World Bank 
Grp. & World Trade Org., THE ROLE OF TRADE IN ENDING POVERTY (2015), 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/worldbankandwto15_e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SWM9-3BSC] (arguing international trade is essential for end-
ing poverty); World Bank Grp. [WBG], Taking on Inequality: Poverty & Shared Pros-
perity 2016 (2016), 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/25078/978146
4809583.pdf [https://perma.cc/2U44-ZL4S] (offering five different policy areas 
where trade can best be used to reduce poverty).   
12  Some voices question that trade can ease poverty.  See Nicole Hassoun, 
Free Trade, Poverty, and Inequality, Philosophy Faculty Scholarship, 2011, 
https://orb.binghamton.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article
=1014&context=philosophy_fac [https://perma.cc/ADY8-2G8C] (claiming that 
the poverty indicators used to support free trade by international financial institu-
tions are flawed and that poverty is worse than the studies show); INEQUALITY, 
GROWTH, AND POVERTY IN AN ERA OF LIBERALIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION (Giovan-
ni A. Cornia ed., 2004) (evaluating within-country income equality over twenty 
years and the factors impacting it).   
13  Towards the End of Poverty, THE ECONOMIST (June 1, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21578665-nearly-1-billion-people-
have-been-taken-out-extreme-poverty-20-years-world-should-aim 
[https://perma.cc/WHD7-8TZY] (arguing that governments should agree reduce 
the number of people in poverty by a billion).   
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and  
2. the protection of human rights:14  75% of countries use trade 
agreements to protect human rights.15   
 
So why not use trade agreements as a novel tool to solve one of 
the most important challenges of today, namely climate change, 
given that they are legally binding, unlike traditional environmen-
tal agreements?16  
The purpose of this Article is to explore the potential of the 
trading system in contributing to decarbonization, focusing on the 
EU and international level.17  The Article first sets the scene on how 
trade agreements may be a legal instrument to mitigate climate 
change and enhance sustainable energy.18  It then provides an 
                                                   
14  See HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (Thomas Cottier, Joost 
Pauwelyn, & Elisabeth Bürgi Bonanomi eds., 2005) (discussing obligations under 
human rights law related to trade); ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER 
NEOLIBERALISM: REIMAGINING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER (2011) (providing an 
overview of the tension between trade and human rights law); Clair Gammage, 
Protecting Human Rights in the Context of Free Trade? The Case of the SADC Group 
Economic Partnership Agreement, 20 EUR. L.J. 779, 792 (2014) (exploring the relation-
ship between human rights and trade in the context of regional trade agreements).   
15  Susan A. Aaronson, Human Rights in PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT 
POLICIES FOR DEV. 443, 466 (Jean-Pierre Chauffour & Jean-Chrisophe Maur eds., 
2011), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/C21.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P5KD-KZX8] (examining the outcomes of efforts to link trade 
to human rights).  See also Anthony E. Cassimatis, HUMAN RIGHTS RELATED TRADE 
MEASURES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007) (detailing trade measures meant to 
address human rights abuses).   
16  See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 456 (2000) (evaluating contemporary international 
legalization and how it reflects the preferences of international actors); Alan 
Boyle, Soft Law in International Law-Making in INTERNATIONAL LAW 118 (Malcolm 
D. Evans ed. 2014) (expounding on the importance of soft law in the international 
legal framework); Thomas A. Mensah, Soft Law: A Fresh Look at an Old Mechanism, 
38 ENVTL POL. & L. 50, 56 (2008) (noting that the difference between hard and soft 
law is not always easy to ascertain).   
17  See generally RAFAEL LEAL-ARCAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EC EXTERNAL 
TRADE LAW AND POLICY (2008) (exploring the law and practice of European Com-
munity trade relations); RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU ENERGY LAW AND POLICY (Ra-
fael Leal-Arcas & Jan Wouters eds., 2017) (reviewing research and trends in EU 
energy law and policy); RAFAEL LEAL-ARCAS, THE EUROPEAN ENERGY UNION: THE 
QUEST FOR SECURE, AFFORDABLE AND SUSTAINABLE ENERGY (2016) (arguing for the 
creation of a European Energy Union as an effective and viable solution to the en-
ergy security problems that the European Union).   
18  There is extensive literature on how trade in environmental goods can 
support a sustainable future.  See, e.g., Zhong Xiang Zhang, Trade in Environmental 
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analysis of the challenges of climate change mitigation and of en-
hancing sustainable energy in the transition towards a decarbon-
ized economy.19  The Article then provides the state of the art and 
subsequently offers to go beyond the state of the art in the trade 
field to help decarbonize the economy.  Next, the Article provides 
a section on the synergistic links between the trading and climate 
regimes.  The penultimate section offers forum options for dealing 
with the convergence of the trade and climate regimes with the aim 
of helping to mitigate climate change and enhance sustainable en-
ergy.  The Article ends with what the future may hold regarding 
the links between international trade and renewable energy.   
 
                                                                                                                   
Goods, with Focus on Climate-friendly Goods and Technologies, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH AND THE WTO 673, 673–99 (Geert Van 
Calster & Denise Prévost eds., 2013) (arguing that trade liberalization will lower 
prices and increase competition for climate-friendly technologies, thereby making 
it easier for countries to meet existing and future greenhouse gas emission com-
mitments); Mark Wu, Why Developing Countries Won’t Negotiate: The Case of the 
WTO Environmental Goods Agreement, 6 TRADE L. & DEV. 93, 93–94 (2014) (rejecting 
the conventional reasons offered to explain the resistance of developing countries 
to negotiate the reduction of trade barriers in environmental goods and offering 
several methods to entice developing countries to participate in the negotiations); 
Monica Araya, The Relevance of the Environmental Goods Agreement in Advancing the 
Paris Agreement Goals and SDGs. A Focus on Clean Energy and Costa Rica’s Experi-
ence, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. 9 (Dec. 2016), 
https://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/research/the_relevance_of_the_envir
onmen-
tal_goods_agreement_in_advancing_the_paris_agreement_goals_and_the_sdgs_0.
pdf [https://perma.cc/6BXR-4LP7] (concluding that the WTO Environmental 
Goods Agreement has the potential to boost clean energy development goals if its 
focus is  broadened to include environmental services from a larger group of 
countries, particularly developing nations); Simon Lester & K. William Watson, 
Free Trade in Environmental Goods: The Trade Remedy Problem, CATO INST. FREE 
TRADE BULL. No. 54 1 (Aug. 19, 2013), https://www.cato.org/publications/free-
trade-bulletin/free-trade-environmental-goods-trade-remedy-problem 
[https://perma.cc/ML33-EKYD] (discussing how better trade policy can lead to 
lower prices for solar, wind, and other environmental energy goods and services).   
19  It is interesting to note that, in the negotiations to the Paris Agreement on 
Climate Change, there were countries that opposed the term “decarbonization” in 
the text.  See Lorenz Moosmann et al., Implementing the Paris Agreement—Issues at 
Stake in View of the COP 22 Climate Change Conference in Marrakesh, at 73–74, PE 
587.319 (Oct. 2016) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/587319/IPOL_S
TU%282016%29587319_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9FQ-FQA8] (observing that 
Saudi Arabia prominently opposed the inclusion of terms like “decarbonization” 
in the Paris Agreement).   
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
 90 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 40:1 
 
2.  SETTING THE SCENE 
 
The twentieth century was characterized by a top-down ap-
proach to the governance of climate change mitigation, energy, and 
international trade.  The twenty-first century, however, offers a 
bottom-up approach.  One of the mega-trends of the twenty-first 
century is the shift to this bottom-up approach (in the true sense of 
the term, namely that power remains with the citizens) implemen-
tation of climate change mitigation plans—a creation of the Paris 
Agreement on Climate Change, which has become the locomotive 
of unilateral20 climate action.21  The same is true in energy govern-
ance, where we are witnessing an energy democratization by de-
centralizing the governance of energy security and creating new 
actors such as prosumers.  But how about international trade gov-
ernance?  How can it be governed from the bottom up?   
Sustainable energy is a burning issue in a world where 1.4 bil-
lion people still have no access to electricity.22  A solution for sus-
tainable energy is better governance of energy trade.23  Energy se-
curity, or access to energy at an affordable price, is one of the main 
problems humanity faces.24  Without access to energy, people and 
countries cannot develop their potential.  Today’s environmental 
                                                   
20  By unilateral action, we mean that the Paris Agreement promotes diversity 
in that countries are free to do unilaterally what they think is best for their own 
political economy in the fight against climate change.  Countries, therefore, agree 
to collective targets, but can also implement their own goals.   
21  Unlike the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, which 
divides countries into Annex I and non-Annex I countries and makes only Annex 
I countries bound to climate change mitigation, the Paris Agreement on Climate 
Change of 2015 proposes universal goals for climate change mitigation.  At the 
COP 23 in November 2017, the US was rather passive given its intent to withdraw 
from the Paris Agreement.  Without the US’s leadership, it might be difficult to 
reach new climate rules and China may use the potential American absence to 
lead future negotiations.   
22  See generally RAFAEL LEAL-ARCAS ET AL., ENERGY SECURITY, TRADE AND THE 
EU: REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 40-41 (2016) (analyzing the exist-
ing energy security solutions through the international trade system, using the EU 
as a case study).   
23  Id. at 40.  
24  See generally RAFAEL LEAL-ARCAS, THE EUROPEAN ENERGY UNION: THE 
QUEST FOR SECURE, AFFORDABLE AND SUSTAINABLE ENERGY (2016) (proposing the 
emulation of common commercial policy to reach a common energy policy in the 
EU, analyzing the possible advancements of pan-European energy infrastructure 
through financial boost, and discussing the climate change mitigation by focusing 
on decarbonizing the economy and analyzing the 2015 Paris Agreement).   
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challenges are driving a shift from fossil fuels to clean and renewa-
ble energy,25 i.e., energy from sustainable sources, as opposed to 
conventional sources such as oil, natural gas, or coal.26  As the price 
of oil goes up, there will be a greater incentive for countries to in-
vest in renewables to eventually obtain a cheaper, cleaner and 
more secure supply of energy.   
These three necessities—energy that is affordable, secure, and 
clean—can be encompassed by the term “sustainable energy.”  
This article aims to develop effective trade policy instruments for 
sustainable energy in the EU.  Some have contested trade’s positive 
impact in the world, but it can be a very strong tool which, in the 
context of sustainable energy, has been under-utilized and under-
theorized.27  When dealing with energy, the role of trade in pro-
duction, transit, and export/import is very relevant.   
Currently, governance of energy trade is fragmented, disjoint-
ed, with selective membership and guided by State interests.  
Think, for instance, of the following institutions and instruments 
that deal with energy trade: the World Trade Organization, prefer-
ential trade agreements, the Energy Charter Conference, the Or-
ganization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries or the Gas Ex-
porting Countries Forum.  This situation hinders transnational 
energy flows.  Despite apparent overlaps between institutions and 
regimes involved in renewable energy trade governance, there are 
significant gaps in the system.  The result is a mixed bag of inci-
dental outcomes arising from an array of disjointed energy-related 
institutions and processes operating at various scales (bilateral, re-
gional, etc.), often each with its own selective membership.   
                                                   
25  See Commission Proposes New Rules for Consumer Centered Clean Energy 
Transition, COM (Nov. 30, 2016) 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/commission-proposes-new-rules-
consumer-centred-clean-energy-transition [https://perma.cc/JAB3-92QF] (declar-
ing that the European Union should lead the transition to clean energy with three 
goals in mind: “putting energy efficiency first, achieving global leadership in re-
newable energies and providing a fair deal for consumers.”).   
26  See generally LEONARDO MASSAI, EUROPEAN CLIMATE AND CLEAN ENERGY 
LAW AND POLICY (2012) (giving an overview of the EU’s climate and clean energy 
law and policy since early 1990s and the EU’s position in the international climate 
dialogue, covering topics such as GHG emissions, renewable energy, energy effi-
ciency, etc.).   
27  See GLOBAL GOVERNANCE THROUGH TRADE: EU POLICIES AND APPROACHES 
92–123 (Jan Wouters et al. eds., 2015) (arguing that regional trade agreements can 
be leveraged to achieve sustainable energy goals while also promoting environ-
mental protection).   
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This Article goes beyond examining the law and governance of 
international trade in energy and its effects on sustainable energy 
to identify existing knowledge gaps in energy trade governance in 
conjunction with non-economic aspects of trade policy.  The ap-
proach of this Article is thus interdisciplinary and large-scale, 
bringing together a holistic analysis of the ever-growing and com-
plex interface between trade and renewable energy from the per-
spective of law, political economy, and international relations,28 
taking into account the fact that the energy field has been tradi-
tionally led by economists.   
 
3.  THE CHALLENGE OF MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE ENERGY  
 
Predictions are that the total world energy consumption will 
increase by 28% from 2015 through 2040.29  As depicted in Figure 1, 
with the exception of coal,30 energy usage from all sources will in-
crease during that period.  
 
 
 
                                                   
28  See generally Joanna I. Lewis, The Rise of Renewable Energy Protectionism: 
Emerging Trade Conflicts and Implications for Low Carbon Development, 14 GLOBAL 
ENVTL. POL. 10, 10-35 (2014) (employing a framework that analyzes the global de-
ployment of renewable energy through the lens of policy and legal research and 
international trade disputes).   
29  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2017 19 (2017), 
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/pdf/0484(2017).pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C5E2-XW7Y]; see also id. at 8 (“The effects of economic growth 
assumptions on energy consumption are addressed in the High and Low Econom-
ic Growth cases. World gross domestic product (GDP) increases by 3.3%/year 
from 2015 to 2040 in the High Economic Growth case and by 2.7%/year in the 
Low Economic Growth case, compared with 3.0%/year in the Reference case.”).   
30  Some EU governments are trying to shut down coal plants; the industry 
has reacted.  See Finland Considers Speeding Up Ban on Coal, XINHUANET (Jan. 7, 
2018, 5:51:20 AM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-
01/07/c_136877044.htm [https://perma.cc/2XHJ-QG9R] (showing that energy 
industry groups are opposing government plans to impose regulations that would 
prohibit or decrease the use of coal); see also Adam Vaughan, UK Government Spells 
Out Plan to Shut Down Coal Plants, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2018, 9:34:00 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jan/05/uk-coal-fired-power-
plants-close-2025 [https://perma.cc/8XUS-U4TR] (demonstrating that govern-
ments can implement regulations resulting in the phase-out of coal plants).   
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Figure 1: Energy consumption up to 2040 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 
 
As depicted in Figure 2, renewables are projected to supply 
31% of world electricity generation in 2040.  The great advantage of 
electricity is that it is difficult to monopolize because it can be pro-
duced from several sources of fuel—from natural gas, wind, solar, 
or biomass.  In addition, if the weather conditions are right, both 
rich and poor countries are capable of producing electricity, partic-
ularly from renewables.   
 
Figure 2: Share of renewables in world electricity generation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 
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`Although wind and solar power will see the most growth among 
renewables for electricity generation, hydro will remain the largest 
single source of renewable electricity generation in the world (see 
Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3: Input of wind and solar in renewable energy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 
 
With its extreme reliance on the rest of the world for its energy 
supply31 and, consequently, its energy security,32 it is in the EU’s 
interest to diversify its energy sources and supply channels, and 
also increase energy efficiency by promoting more sustainable 
practices and greater energy market integration, which will en-
hance the EU’s renewables potential.  In fact, we see efforts in those 
directions through the promotion of the EU’s Internal Energy Mar-
                                                   
31  See generally Daniel Yergin, Ensuring Energy Security, FOREIGN AFF., (2006) 
(acknowledging the fact that the entire energy supply chain needs to be protect-
ed); see also DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND POWER 
(2008), (discussing politically worrisome signs of stress throughout the US energy 
supply system); DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE REMAKING 
OF THE MODERN WORLD (2011) (understanding the risks and requirements of ener-
gy security in the twenty-first century). 
32  See generally Jerry Taylor & Peter Van Doren, The Energy Security Obsession, 
6 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 475 (2008) (discussing the wide gulf between the way for-
eign policy elites view energy security and the way economists view energy secu-
rity); see also David G. Victor & Linda Yueh, The New Energy Order: Managing Inse-
curities in the Twenty-first Century, FOREIGN AFF. 89 (2010) (positing that the 
world’s energy market is becoming increasingly fragmented, necessitating a shift 
to new approaches to reliably supply the world’s energy needs). 
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ket and the Energy Community.  Trade policy and regulation can 
be instrumental in achieving these goals.  For example, there is po-
tential to incorporate renewable energy provisions within the EU’s 
numerous regional trade agreements (RTAs);33 there are trade in-
centives to better manage competition and invest in green technol-
ogies; there are possibilities for exporting cutting-edge EU technol-
ogies through the EU’s trade and bilateral cooperation agreements. 
Access to energy (and renewables more specifically) is a com-
mon concern and requires local and global action.34  Currently, 
there is no cohesive governance for global energy trade, which has 
implications for renewable energy trade governance.  Governance 
of energy trade arises by default, rather than design, through the ad 
hoc interplay of different aspects of the international economic sys-
tem.35  Many institutions involving different actors and geograph-
ical scope address energy security.  If combined with climate 
change mitigation, there are studies that identify over sixty,36 and 
even hundreds, of transnational organizations that deal with its 
                                                   
33  See generally Nicolas A.J. Croquet, The climate-change norms under the 
EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement: between soft and hard law, in GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE THROUGH TRADE EU POLICIES AND APPROACHES 124–157 (Jan Wouters 
et al. eds., 2015) (offering a view into how the EU has implemented renewable en-
ergy goals in the context of the EU-Korea free trade agreement); see also Sikina Jin-
nah & Elisa Morgera, Environmental Provisions in American and EU Free Trade 
Agreements: A Preliminary Comparison and Research Agenda, REV. OF EUR., COMP. & 
INT’L ENVTL L. 324 (2013) (illuminating the differing approaches of the EU and 
America in incorporating environmental provisions into free trade agreements); 
Jean Frederic Morin & Rosalie Gauthier Nadeau, Environmental Gems in Trade 
Agreements: Little-known Clauses for Progressive Trade Agreements, CTR. FOR INT’L 
GOVERNANCE INNOVATION PAPERS (2017) (spotlighting important environmental 
provisions in recent trade agreements to identify best practices for future agree-
ments).  
34  Jay Walljasper, Elinor Ostrom’s 8 Principles for Managing a Commons (Oct. 2, 
2011), http://www.onthecommons.org/magazine/elinor-ostroms-8-principles-
managing-commmons#sthash.9MPxgwbH.dpbs [https://perma.cc/XA82-
4MUG]. 
35  See generally Ann Florini & Benjamin K. Sovacool, Bridging the Gaps in 
Global Energy Governance, 17 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 57 (2011) (laying out global en-
ergy related issues to clarify areas needing further research); see also Ann Florini & 
Benjamin K. Sovacool, Who Governs Energy? The Challenges Facing Global Energy 
Governance, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 5239 (2009) (exploring the existing global energy 
governance system and providing support for the system’s usefulness in tackling 
global energy issues). 
36  See generally Harriet Bulkeley et al., Governing Climate Change Transnation-
ally: Assessing the Evidence from a Database of Sixty Initiatives, 30 ENV’T & PLAN. C: 
GOV’T & POL’Y 591 (2012) (analyzing sixty transnational governance initiatives and 
their implications on governing climate change). 
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governance.37  As a result, we have a polycentric and very complex 
institutional structure.38  While its polycentric nature is not a prob-
lem per se—in fact, arguably the complexity of the energy system 
lends itself to polycentric governance39—the situation has resulted 
in a fragmentation of the global40 and European energy trade re-
gimes, a lack of cohesiveness of the global and European energy 
trade systems, divergent national interests, and a diversity of ener-
gy sources.41  For such a polycentric system to succeed, a high level 
of coordination and trust is necessary between the various actors 
involved.  As it stands, the governance regime for energy trade is 
not conducive to EU sustainable energy. 
How can we explain the proliferation of energy security institu-
tions? Some scholars focused on the international level suggest that 
the regulatory activity of various international institutions repre-
sents a ‘regime complex.’42  This concept is used to refer to ‘partial-
ly overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions governing a par-
ticular issue-area.’43  Others propose understanding the 
                                                   
37  See generally Jessica F. Green, Private Standards in the Climate Regime: The 
Greenhouse Gas Protocol, 12 BUS. & POL. 1 (2010) (explaining the success of NGOs in 
causing the adoption of greenhouse gas emissions standards by private compa-
nies). 
38  See generally Kenneth W. Abbott, The Transnational Regime Complex for Cli-
mate Change, 30 ENV’T & PLAN. C: GOV’T & POL’Y 571 (2012) (generating frame-
works to analyze the proliferation of transnational climate governance). 
39  See generally Philip Andrews-Speed & Xunpeng Shi, What Might the G20 
Under China’s Presidency Deliver for Global Energy Governance?, ENERGY STUD. INST. 
POL’Y BRIEF 8 (2015) (observing that the G20 is a good forum for the promotion 
and creation of global energy governance). 
40  See generally Timothy Meyer, Global Public Goods, Governance Risk, and In-
ternational Energy, 22 DUKE J.  COMP. & INT’L L. 319 (2012) (showing that the design 
of some international institutions increases the chance of gridlock concerning pub-
lic goods, like climate change regulation). 
41  See generally Rafael Leal-Arcas & Andrew Filis, Conceptualizing EU Energy 
Security Through an EU Constitutional Law Perspective, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1225 
(2013) (focusing on EU energy production and consumption, and the challenges 
the EU faces in striving to create a compatible energy and security policy). 
42  See generally Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for 
Climate Change, 9 PERSP. ON POL. 7 (2011) (holding that the current global climate 
regime—a loose configuration of institutions—is better equipped to tackle climate 
change than a comprehensive global regime) ; see also Amandine Orsini et al., Re-
gime Complexes: A Buzz, a Boom, or a Boost for Global Governance, 14 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE, 419 (2013) (building out a more comprehensive understanding of 
regime complexes in various areas of global governance). 
43  See generally Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant 
Genetic Resources, 58 INT’L ORG. 277 (2004). 
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governance activities by private and public actors in terms of a 
‘transnational regime complex,’ which is composed of civil-society 
organizations, governments, and business, which is coined as 
‘governance triangle.’44  In the same manner, how can we explain 
the fragmentation of renewable energy governance?  And does it 
lead to forum-shopping?45 
At the European level, it is vital that the EU take the right steps 
and decisions to ensure sustainable energy.  A more cohesive gov-
ernance system for energy trade would facilitate renewable energy 
usage, avoid unnecessary legal disputes and provide predictability.  
Achieving this will require a thorough understanding of the ele-
ments, workings, and evolution of the current energy trade gov-
ernance regime and its consequences for European sustainable en-
ergy.  
Energy trade is a key component of both the global and EU 
economies, and international trade in renewable energy spans a 
number of policy areas, including trade, investment, economic de-
velopment, and environmental protection.  The very nature of en-
ergy—namely its centrality to almost every field of human en-
deavor—and the very nature of traditional energy resources—
namely finiteness, uneven distribution, and high desirability—lead 
to the politicization of energy and encourage intense competition 
for control over energy resources between actors.46  While energy 
supply and consumption are important aspects of the global and 
EU energy economy,47 they do not exist in an equilibrious relation-
                                                   
44  See generally Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: 
Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF 
GLOBAL REGULATION (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009) (examining the 
role of non-state actors in providing “regulatory standard-setting” international-
ly). 
45  See generally Karen J. Alter & Sophie Meunier, The Politics of International 
Regime Complexity, 7 PERSP. ON POL. 13 (2009) (discussing the challenges of an in-
crease in international regimes and impact on international cooperation, as well as 
the politics of power-play that arise in such a system). 
46  See generally PHILIP ANDREWS-SPEED, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION FOR 
RESOURCES: THE ROLE OF THE LAW, THE STATE, AND OF MARKETS (2008); see also NICO 
SCHRIJVER, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES: BALANCING RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
1–29 (1997) (studying the impact of sovereignty on states’ rights as well as duties 
with regard to their natural resources); ENERGY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Andreas Wenger et al. eds., 2009) (focusing on how 
energy affects conflict and cooperation among consuming and producing na-
tions). 
47  See generally DANIELYERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE 
REMAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD (2011), supra note 31 (discussing the apparent 
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ship.  Rather, they are heavily mediated by political considerations 
and by the very operation of global markets,48 which dictate the ex-
tent to which energy needs are ultimately met. 
The dominant opinion is that trade liberalization will increase 
economic activity49 and therefore energy consumption.  All coun-
tries require energy resources, but few possess them, and thus 
trade in fossil fuels (primarily oil and gas) and renewables is cru-
cial to fulfill global energy needs.50  Moreover, how energy from 
traditional sources is governed has an impact on renewable energy 
governance.  Internationally, there is more trade in oil than in any 
other good or service.  Half of world trade in services is energy-
dependent.  Yet, the GATT/WTO has historically not preoccupied 
itself with energy trade.  Very few energy-rich countries saw a 
need to join the GATT/WTO club, given that the reduction of im-
port restrictions—one of the main goals of the multilateral trading 
system—is not an issue when it comes to energy.  Saudi Arabia, 
one of the main energy-producing countries in the world, only 
joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2005 and several 
energy-producing countries are still not WTO Members. 
The Article will focus on the trade aspects of renewable energy 
governance and on how they could be adjusted to better promote 
sustainable energy in the EU.  EU sustainable energy depends up-
on institutionalized energy-related internal as well as international 
cooperation.51  For instance, effective systems for energy trade and 
energy transit enhance energy security for those economies in-
volved in such cooperation.  At the domestic level, a single agent—
namely the State—is the authority that adopts measures towards 
                                                                                                                   
stress on the U.S. energy supply system).  
48  See generally GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, PHISHING FOR 
PHOOLS: THE ECONOMICS OF MANIPULATION AND DECEPTION (2015) (illustrating how 
the free market results in sellers utilizing deceptive practices in order to maximize 
profit and outlining ways in which individuals have combatted such trickery). 
49  See DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 47–66 (2011) (exploring how free trade benefits 
countries and arguing for a new approach to promoting the benefits of trade lib-
eralization).  
50  See generally GIACOMO LUCIANI, SECURITY OF OIL SUPPLIES: ISSUES AND 
REMEDIES (2013) (surveying a variety of topics concerning the security of oil, in-
cluding: resource nationalism, armed conflicts, the transportation of oil, strategic 
oil stocks, and international oil markets). 
51  See Maya Jegen, Two Paths to Energy Security: The EU and NAFTA, 66 INT’L 
J. 73, 73 (2010) (discussing the interrelation of energy security, climate change, and 
open markets). 
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the energy security of the territory/economy that it controls.52  
Such an agent is not omnipotent in its attempts towards energy se-
curity, given that energy security often relies on factors—e.g., en-
ergy commodities’ price and availability—over which it has little 
or no control.  
At the EU level, there are numerous actors who have influence 
over the energy economy, including EU and Member State bodies.  
This plurality of actors and the variety of interests at play—e.g., in-
terests across the national-regional-international spectrum, the 
public-private spectrum,53 and across the policy spectrum—mean 
that the achievement of EU sustainable energy is a considerably 
complex challenge.54  While all sovereign actors/economies have 
an interest in their respective energy security, global energy securi-
ty is a concern to none.  As such, global energy security is not cur-
rently considered a common concern as is climate change.55  In that 
respect, this Article aims to shed light on incentives for States to 
cooperate on sustainable energy, highlighting ways in which it is, 
in fact, a common concern. 
At the international level, the EU is one of a patchwork of insti-
tutions that may have implications for cross-border energy trade.56  
While the EU lacks the powers of a sovereign actor to diplomatical-
                                                   
52  See generally MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE END OF ENERGY: THE UNMAKING OF 
AMERICA’S ENVIRONMENT, SECURITY, AND INDEPENDENCE (2011) (arguing that Amer-
icans have experienced forty years of energy policy incompetence and that better 
policy decisions are required to prevent harmful effects on American environ-
ment, security, and independence). 
53  See generally PAUL HAWKEN, THE ECOLOGY OF COMMERCE: A DECLARATION 
OF SUSTAINABILITY (2010) (claiming that business both causes the most harm to the 
environment and possesses the greatest potential to tackle the globe’s sustainabil-
ity problems). 
54  See generally ANDREAS GOLDTHAU & JAN MARTIN WITTE, GLOBAL ENERGY 
GOVERNANCE: THE NEW RULES OF THE GAME 73–98 (2010) (outlining the major ener-
gy trends and how regulatory institutions spanning the globe can best adapt their 
governance systems to the new challenges). 
55  See RAFAEL LEAL-ARCAS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1–23 
(2013) (offering the view that international trade regimes are tackling climate 
change and exploring how the international community can effectively respond to 
climate change through the international trading system). 
56  See Sijbren de Jong & Jan Wouters, Institutional Actors in International Ener-
gy Law, 115 LEUVEN CTR. FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE STUD. 1, 21 (2013) (finding that 
“the contemporary international institutional energy architecture represents a 
strongly fragmented ‘patchwork’ of organisations and fora, each with its own 
member base, different degree of institutionalisation and enforcement capabil-
ity.”). 
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ly pursue its energy security in the manner that China or the US 
may, it does possess a comprehensive energy policy that is multi-
faceted and that makes good use of the powers that lie within its 
competencies.57  The WTO also provides governance over trade 
within its scope, including over energy trade.  Many other institu-
tions exist that provide degrees of governance over aspects of trade 
in energy at the inter-State level.  This patchwork of institutions 
and regimes amounts to a sort of “accidental” energy trade gov-
ernance regime, and presents some areas of overlap.  For instance, 
both the WTO and the Energy Charter Treaty (a 1994 multilateral 
treaty that regulates energy) have rules that apply to the trade, in-
vestment, and environmental-protection aspects of energy.  These 
overlapping rules in no way amount to cohesive governance of en-
ergy trade. 
 
4.  STATE OF THE ART 
 
Existing literature has taken a comparative approach,58 but fo-
cuses only on some aspects of the problem.  Some have carried out 
their comparative analyses on the trade aspects of energy;59 others 
                                                   
57  See SANAM SALEM HAGHIGI, ENERGY SECURITY: THE EXTERNAL LEGAL 
RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION WITH MAJOR OIL AND GAS SUPPLYING COUNTRIES 
1–8 (2007) (arguing that EU energy security depends on a triangular approach, 
which encompasses cohesion among member states on issues of energy policy, 
recognizing and cooperating with the development goals of oil-producing coun-
tries, and a focus on political cooperation with energy-producing countries). 
58  See generally ENERGY SECURITY FOR THE EU IN THE 21ST CENTURY: MARKETS, 
GEOPOLITICS AND CORRIDORS (Jose Maria Marin-Quemada et al. eds., 2012) (provid-
ing a comprehensive analysis of energy risks facing the EU as well as evaluating 
both the individual and collective energy security policies of the EU member 
states); THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: FROM 
FRAGMENTATION TO COHERENCE (Thomas Cottier et al. eds., 2011) (examining how 
international trade regulation in areas ranging from environmental protection to 
labor standards); Rafael Leal-Arcas & Andrew Filis, The Fragmented Governance of 
the Global Energy Economy: A Legal-Institutional Analysis, 6 J. WORLD ENERGY L. BUS. 
1 (2013) (dissecting the current multi-faceted regulatory environment governing 
global energy security and investigating models of governance to improve global 
energy security); Benjamin K. Sovacool, An International Comparison of Four Poly-
centric Approaches to Climate and Energy Governance, 39 ENERGY POL. 3832 (2011) 
(exploring a polycentric approach to climate and energy governance in which dif-
ferent actors—businesses, politicians, regulators, and individuals—and scales of 
governance—local, regional, national, and global—interact to overcome collective 
action problems in addressing energy and climate governance).  
59  See generally REGULATION OF ENERGY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: WTO, 
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on the external dimension of EU energy law and policy60 or the in-
ternal dimension of EU energy policy;61 others on the inter-
relationships between trade,62 investment,63 transit64 and/or envi-
                                                                                                                   
NAFTA, AND ENERGY CHARTER (Yulia Selivanova ed., 2011) (presenting a holistic 
view of how trade law interacts with energy transactions while detailing the regu-
latory gaps and uncertainties stemming from the various sources of trade law); 
UN Conference on Trade and Development, Trade Agreements, Petroleum and Ener-
gy Policies (2000) (assisting with the challenges specific to petroleum-producing 
countries in the decision-making processes surrounding trade negotiations); Paolo 
Davide Farah & Elena Cima, WTO and Renewable Energy: Lessons from the Case Law, 
49 J. WORLD TRADE 1103 (2015) (characterizing WTO treatment of subsidies gener-
ally and whether that framework will be adequate for the purpose of renewable 
energy subsidies); MAKING GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE EFFECTIVE: HARD AND 
SOFT LAW INSTITUTIONS IN A CROWDED WORLD (John Kirton et al. eds. 2010) (offer-
ing an analysis of existing international institutions and how they can be im-
proved to address new challenges from an increasingly globalized world); Susan 
L. Sakmar, Bringing Energy Trade into the WTO: The Historical Context, Current Sta-
tus, and Potential Implications for the Middle East Region 18 IND. INT’L. COMP. L. REV. 
96 (2008) (discussing how the evolving treatment of oil at the WTO will impact the 
Middle East, the geopolitics of oil, EU trade proposals on energy, and additional 
proposals for freer trade in energy services). 
60  See generally DECARBONIZATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: INTERNAL POLICIES 
AND EXTERNAL STRATEGIES (Claire Dupont & Sebastian Oberthuer eds., 2015) (ex-
amining the EU’s objective to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% by 2050 
and how that will impact EU relations with external energy partners); ANDREAS 
GOLDTHAU & NICK SITTER, A LIBERAL ACTOR IN A REALIST WORLD: THE EUROPEAN 
UNION REGULATORY STATE AND THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENERGY (2015) 
(detailing EU policies in oil, gas, and climate change); KIM TALUS, EU ENERGY LAW 
AND POLICY: A CRITICAL ACCOUNT (2013) (describing EU energy law and policy, its 
geopolitical aspects, and how it has changed over time).  
61  See Florian Baumann, Europe’s Way to Energy Security. The Outer Dimen-
sions of Energy Security: From Power Politics to Energy Governance, 15 EUR. FOREIGN 
AFF. REV. 77, 77–95 (2010) (discussing European energy security).  
62  See Wen-Chen Shih, Energy Security, GATT/WTO, and Regional Agreements, 
49 NAT. RES. J. 433, 433–484 (2009) (discussing the role of the WTO and regional 
agreements in the context of energy security).  
63  See generally Arunabha Ghosh, Seeking Coherence in Complexity? The Gov-
ernance of Energy by Trade & Investment Institutions, 2 GLOBAL POL’Y 106 (2011) (de-
scribing how the international energy law framework is impacted by trade law 
and the mandates of numerous institutions and agreements); World Energy 
Council, World Energy Perspectives: Rules of Trade and Investment 4–7, (2016), 
https://www.worldenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Full-
report__Non-tariff-measures_next-steps-for-catalysing-the-low-carbon-
economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/M57J-LW86] (proposing the reduction in non-
tariff measures that affect the low-carbon energy sector to support effective and 
efficient decarbonization). 
64  See generally KATJA YAFIMAVA, THE TRANSIT DIMENSION OF EU ENERGY 
SECURITY: RUSSIAN GAS TRANSIT ACROSS UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA (2011) 
(providing a framework for understanding the gas relationship between Europe, 
Russia, and the Western Commonwealth of Independent States). 
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ronmental agendas65 vis-à-vis energy;66 and others, while having 
carried out thorough cross-policy comparative examinations,67 do 
                                                   
65  See generally DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, 
AND THE FUTURE (1994) (arguing for reform in the international trade rules and in-
stitutions in order to address environmental concerns); Thijs Van de Graaf, Frag-
mentation in Global Energy Governance: Explaining the Creation of IRENA, 13 GLOBAL 
ENVTL. POL. 14 (2013) (detailing the creation of IRENA and arguing that it was a 
result of institutions hedging against the perceived fossil fuel and nuclear bias of 
the IEA); Lakshman Guruswamy, Energy and Environmental Security: The Need for 
Action, 3 J. ENVTL. L. 209 (1991) (arguing that the environmental security and ener-
gy security challenges faced in the United States are a result of dependence on 
fossil fuels); Edith Brown Weiss, Integrating Environment and Trade, 19 J. INT’L. 
ECON. L. 367–369 (2016) (exploring the “difficulty [of] how to reconcile legitimate 
environment and trade concerns and to have the two bodies of law work together 
to address urgent problems today, especially climate change”); Jorgen Wettestad, 
Interaction Between EU Carbon Trading and the International Climate Regime: Synergies 
and Learning, 9 INT’L. ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL. L. ECON., 393–408 (2009) (analyzing 
the interaction between the EU emissions trading system and the international 
climate regime); Steven Yamarik & Sucharita Ghosh, Do Regional Trading Arrange-
ments Harm the Environment? An Analysis of 162 Countries in 1990 6(2) APPLIED 
ECONOMETRICS & INT’L DEV. 15 (2006) (evaluating how regional trade agreements 
impact the environment); Rafael Leal-Arcas, Trade Proposals for Climate Action, 6 
TRADE L. DEV. 11 (2014) (examining the ways trade policy, and in particular trade 
agreements, can promote positive environmental results, particularly in the con-
text of climate change); Scott Barrett, Climate Change and International Trade: Lessons 
on Their Linkage from International Environmental Agreements (2010), 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/climate_jun10_e/background_pap
er6_e.pdf (explaining how linking trade and the environment was a success for 
the protection of the ozone layer and why a similar approach will not work for 
climate change).  
66  See generally GLOBAL CHALLENGES AT THE INTERSECTION OF TRADE, ENERGY 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Joost Pauwelyn ed. 2010) (compiling a variety of perspec-
tives in order to determine how best to improve well-being through trade while 
simultaneously protecting the environment and optimizing the use of energy re-
sources). 
67  See generally ENERGY SECURITY: MANAGING RISK IN A DYNAMIC LEGAL AND 
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT (Barry Barton et al. eds., 2004) (providing an overview 
of energy security issues and themes and analyzing the approaches of a variety of 
countries before ultimately forecasting trends); MICHAEL B. MCELROY, ENERGY: 
PERSPECTIVES, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS (2009) (explaining how humans came to 
be in a position to have such a significant effect on the global environment and 
what can be done to improve energy sustainability); JOSE GOLDEMBERG, ENERGY: 
WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW (2012) (explaining the world energy system); 
THIJS VAN DE GRAAF, THE POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONS OF GLOBAL ENERGY 
GOVERNANCE (2013) (providing an analysis of international energy cooperation 
and the potential for reform at the IEA); Benjamin K. Sovacool & Ann Florini, Ex-
amining the Complications of  Global Energy Governance, 30 J. ENERGY & NAT. RES. L. 
235 (2012) (examining the difficulties associated with global energy governance 
and arguing that a more nuanced approach is required); Matthew Smith & Naing 
Htoo, Energy Security: Security for Whom?, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L. J. 217 (2008) 
(assessing the human rights implications of natural gas extraction in Burma). 
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not explore the systemic implications of their subject matter for EU 
energy security per se.68  Moreover, there is literature on the impli-
cations of global69 and regional systems on energy security,70 spe-
cific to certain structures—e.g., the EU71 and the North American 
Free Trade Agreement—and to limited memberships.72  Other re-
search looks at the relationship of regional or sectoral systems for 
global energy governance,73 but does not focus comprehensively 
                                                   
68  See generally INTERNATIONAL ENERGY GOVERNANCE: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 
(Rafael Leal-Arcas et al. eds., 2014) (surveying a variety of legal issues concerning 
energy such as energy market liberalization and energy exploration); ANGUS 
JOHNSTON & GUY BLOCK, EU ENERGY LAW (2012); THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
ENERGY SECURITY (Benjamin Sovacool ed., 2011) (analyzing differing conceptions 
of energy security and ways that it can be measured nationally and international-
ly). 
69 See generally Fatih Birol, Energy for All: The Next Challenge, 3 GLOBAL POL’Y 
184 (2012) (discussing issues related to universal access to modern energy ser-
vices); Benjamin K. Sovacool & Ann Florini, Examining the Complications of Global 
Energy Governance, 30 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L., 235 (2012) (examining fun-
damental obstacles to effective global energy governance); Aleh Cherp, Jessica 
Jewell, & Andreas Goldthau, Governing Global Energy: Systems, Transitions, Com-
plexity, 2 GLOBAL POL’Y 75 (2011) (discussing the need for a polycentric governance 
system to meet interlinked energy challenges); Navroz K. Dubash, & Ann Florini, 
Mapping Global Energy Governance, 2 GLOBAL POL’Y 6 (2011) (discussing the chal-
lenges inherent in addressing global energy policy). 
70  See generally A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, Towards Regional Energy Co-Operation 
in the Asia-Pacific: Some Lessons from the Energy Charter Treaty, 3 J. WORLD INV. 1061 
(2002) (addressing the importance of and challenges that arise from energy coop-
eration in the Asia-Pacific region). 
71  See generally EU ENERGY INNOVATION POLICY TOWARDS 2050 (Jean-Michel 
Glachant, Nicole Ahner & Leonardo Meeus eds., 2012) (discussing the roadmap 
and challenges that come with planning future EU energy police); JEAN-MICHEL 
GLACHANT ET AL., A NEW ARCHITECTURE FOR EU GAS SECURITY OF SUPPLY (2012) 
(exploring current EU gas security of supply governance in evaluating whether 
the EU in on track to meet their European supply security policy goals). 
72  See generally Sijbren de Jong & Jan Wouters, Institutional Actors in Interna-
tional Energy Law (Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, Working Paper 
No. 115, 2013) (assessing the merits and shortcomings of international organiza-
tions within the energy field). 
73  See generally ENERGY SECURITY: MANAGING RISK IN A DYNAMIC LEGAL AND 
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT (Barry Barton et al. eds., 2004) (discussing energy secu-
rity on international, regional, and national levels); Neil Gunningham, Confronting 
the Challenge of Energy Governance, 1 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 119 (2012) (examining 
“what forms of energy law, regulation and governance are most needed to over-
come these challenges and whether answers are most likely to be found in hierar-
chy, markets, or networks”); DYNAMICS OF ENERGY GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE AND 
RUSSIA (Caroline Kuzemko et al. eds., 2012) (addressing energy issues in both Eu-
rope and Russia by focusing on questions of energy governance through an inter-
national political economy perspective); Rafael Leal-Arcas, The EU and Russia as 
Energy Trading Partners: Friends or Foes?, 14 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 337 (2009) (ex-
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on EU sustainable energy.  
5.  MAKING GREATER USE OF THE TRADING SYSTEM 
5.1.  Rationale 
 
Scholars have explained climate change activities in terms of 
multilevel governance,74 transnational governance,75 polycentrici-
ty,76 or fragmentation.77  This article will go a step further and look 
at how the trading system can be used as a vehicle to mitigate cli-
mate change, enhance energy security and help grow economies.78  
Is there a transnational legal order for renewables?  If so, what are 
its boundaries?  If not, why does it not yet exist?  
Very little theoretical work exists on renewable energy law and 
even less on trade in renewables law, so this article will address an 
important knowledge gap from an interdisciplinary perspective.  
                                                                                                                   
amining the potential for a European Commission and Russia trade partnership). 
74  See generally Hari M. Osofsky, Local Approaches to Transnational Corporate 
Responsibility: Mapping the Role of Subnational Climate Change Litigation, 20 PAC. 
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 143 (2007) (analyzing the impact of subnation-
al tribunals on climate change litigation). 
75  See generally Philipp Pattberg, & Johannes Stripple, Beyond the Public and 
Private Divide: Remapping Transnational Climate Governance in the 21st Century, 8 
INT’L. ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L. & ECON. 367 (2008) (discussing the need for 
non-state and transnational approaches in dealing with climate change). 
76  Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change 
(World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5095, 2009) (arguing that cli-
mate change poses a collective action problem that is best addressed at multiple 
scales and levels). 
77  See generally Cinnamon Pinon Carlarne, Good Climate Governance: Only a 
Fragmented System of International Law Away?, 30 L. & POL’Y 450 (2008) (advocating 
minimizing  gaps between environmental law and other areas of international law 
in order to develop a system of global climate governance); William Boyd, Climate 
Change, Fragmentation, and the Challenges of Global Environmental Law: Elements of a 
Post-Copenhagen Assemblage, 32 U. OF PA. J. INT’L L. 457 (2010) (discussing the frag-
mentation and challenges that face global climate governance in since the 2009 
UN climate conference in Copenhagen). 
78  See generally Céline Bak, Growth, Innovation and Trade in Environmental 
Goods (Center for International Governance Innovation, Policy Brief No. 67, 2015) 
(discussing the impact of global trade in environmental goods on climate change); 
KATE RAWORTH, DOUGHNUT ECONOMICS: SEVEN WAYS TO THINK LIKE A 21ST-
CENTURY ECONOMIST (Joni Praded ed., 2017) (discussing economic ways of thought 
and potential benefits to the environment); HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: 
THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (1997) (criticizing mainstream eco-
nomics for prioritizing efficiency over equity and for wrongfully assuming that 
efficiency and equity are necessarily competing goals). 
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As a result, it will create a new field of research and open up new 
horizons for scholarship in three ways: 1) by exploring how trade 
can promote renewable energy thereby helping to mitigate climate 
change;79 2) through the application of our findings to other areas 
of sustainable development, such as trade and gender issues;80 and 
3) by addressing how trade is underutilized as a tool to promote 
issues of global common concern. 
We stand to achieve considerable gains when trade law be-
comes a tool for change.81  Trade law can help mitigate climate 
change and enhance sustainable energy.82  And it is well known 
that, thanks to trade, countries grow economically.83  Trade brings 
the triple benefit of economic, environmental, and social impact.  
But can countries grow sustainably?84  This hypothesis—that trade 
                                                   
79  For some preliminary work, see RAFAEL LEAL-ARCAS & EDUARDO ALVAREZ 
ARMAS, EU CLIMATE DIPLOMACY: POLITICS, TECHNOLOGY AND NETWORKS (Stephen 
Minas & Vassilis Ntousas eds., 2018). 
80  See generally Women Watch, Gender Equality & Trade Policy, (Resource Pa-
per, 2011), 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/feature/trade/gender_equality_and_trade_p
olicy.pdf (linking gender equality and trade policy); JANET DINE, COMPANIES, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2005) (evaluating the roles companies 
play in trade and globalization and how they fail to achieve basic human rights). 
81  See generally WTO, Harnessing Trade for Sustainable Development and a Green 
Economy (2011), 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/brochure_rio_20_e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5G9J-XSXP] (assessing the discussions and potential gains that 
trade can contribute to sustainable development and a green economy). 
82  See Pascal Lamy, Director-General, WTO Speech at Yale University: The 
“Greening” of the WTO Has Started (Oct. 23, 2007), 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl79_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/3ENW-M77Y] (discussing the WTO as capable of delivering 
environmental justice). 
83  See UN Sustainable Development Goal 8, 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg8 [https://perma.cc/LPV2-4YR4] 
(proposing a goal to be reviewed by the 2019 High Level Political Forum on Sus-
tainable Development).  See also Gregory Mankiw, Why Economists Are Worried 
About International Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/business/trump-economists-trade-
tariffs.html [https://perma.cc/WL2B-3FG8] (stating that trade improves average 
living standards). 
84  See generally RETHINKING CAPITALISM: ECONOMICS AND POLICY FOR 
SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH (Michael Jacobs & Mariana Mazzucato, eds., 
2016) (discussing ways of rethinking capitalism including a discussion on eco-
nomic issues of environmental change); Lawrence H. Summers, The Age of Secular 
Stagnation: What It Is and What to Do About It, 95 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (2016) (discussing 
the theory of secular stagnation or the increased propensity to save as a drag on 
demand in industrial economies). 
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law can help mitigate climate change and enhance sustainable en-
ergy—may be replicated in other governance issues.85 
I argue that renewable energy may become the engine to obtain 
the three attributes of sustainable energy: clean, secure and afford-
able energy.  First, renewable energy does not pollute.  Second, ef-
forts are being made to make it increasingly secure via storage sys-
tems.  Lastly, through significant research and many trials, the 
production of renewable energy will become more and more 
commonplace and thus more affordable.  Like computers or cell 
phones, which initially were very expensive, renewable energy will 
become cheaper to produce, attain, and transport.  
Trade has always played a role in foreign relations, poverty re-
duction, and societal advancement.  Trade has had many positive 
impacts on the sustainability agenda, as mandated by the preamble 
to the WTO Agreement.  We aim to fill the theoretical and empiri-
cal gap for how trade law can help mitigate climate change and 
enhance sustainable energy.  As a result of this knowledge gap, we 
have missed crucial opportunities for cooperation between trade 
and climate change. 
Let me give you examples of missed opportunities between the 
trade and climate change agendas: In the 1990s, two major agree-
ments were concluded—one on climate change, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),86 and one 
on international trade, the WTO Agreement.87  It is surprising that 
                                                   
85  One can think, for instance, of the argument that, if China and India bring 
millions of people into the middle class, the world will not be sustainable due to 
higher levels of consumption (of goods, food, energy) in these two countries; 
however, for a proposal to ensure sustainable consumption and production pat-
terns, see UN Sustainable Development Goal 12, 
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-consumption-
production/ [https://perma.cc/WGZ5-9VPF] (ensuring sustainable consumption 
and production patterns are about “promoting resource and energy efficiency, 
sustainable infrastructure, and providing access to basic services, green and de-
cent jobs and a better quality of life for all.”).  
86  See Geoffry Palmer, The Earth Summit: What Went Wrong at Rio? 70 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 1005 (1992) (analyzing what went wrong at the Rio Earth Summit when 
the UNFCCC was adopted). 
87  Some 20th-century trade agreements already contained reference to climate 
change or greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction even before the UNFCCC 
was signed.  See Fourth ACP-EEC Convention 1991 O.J. (L 229) 3, Article 41 (“The 
Parties recognize the value of exchanging views, using existing consultation 
mechanisms under this Convention, on major ecological hazards, whether on a 
planetary scale (such as the greenhouse effect, the deterioration of the ozone layer, 
tropical forests, etc.), or of a more specific scope resulting from the application of 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/3
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the WTO Agreement only briefly mentions in its preamble the im-
portance of “sustainable development” in the context of interna-
tional trade since the trade community already knew of the danger 
of climate change from the existence of the UNFCCC.88  I argue 
that this was a missed opportunity for trade law to play a bigger 
role in mitigating climate change.  Years later, the Paris Agreement 
on Climate Change was created in 2015, and does not even men-
tion the term “trade.”  These are missed opportunities to cooperate 
between the trade and climate regimes.  
 
5.2.  New concept:  Trade as a vehicle for climate action and sustainable 
energy  
 
Trade law can be used as a vehicle not only for climate action89 
and sustainable energy,90 but also for many of the other sustainable 
                                                                                                                   
industrial technology.”).  Europe Agreement between the European Communities 
and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Hungary, of the oth-
er part, 1991 O.J. (L 347) Article 79 (“Cooperation shall centre on: . . . global cli-
mate change . . . . 3.  To these ends, the Parties plan to cooperate in the following 
areas: . . . development of strategies, particularly with regard to global and climat-
ic issues . . . . ”). 
88  See generally Gabrielle Marceau & Fabio Morosini, The Status of Sustainable 
Development in the Law of the World Trade Organization, in ARBITRAGEM COMÉRCIO 
INTERNACIONAL: ESTUDOS EM HOMENAGEM A LUIZ OLAVO BAPTISTA 60 (Umberto Cel-
li, Jr. et al. eds., 2013) (discussing the interaction between the WTO and sustaina-
ble development).  
89  See, e.g., Charles E. Di Leva & Xiaoxin Shi, The Paris Agreement and the In-
ternational Trade Regime: Considerations for Harmonization, 17 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & 
POL’Y 20 (2016) (describing how many of the parties to the Paris Agreement have 
proposed to increase their use of renewable energy through financial incentives 
such as trade-in-tariffs and restrictions on energy-inefficient imports); Clara Bran-
di, Trade Elements in Countries’ Climate Contributions under the Paris Agreement, 
INT’L CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV. (2017) (explaining how trade can 
play a role in supporting climate action, in particular by “facilitating the diffusion 
of climate-friendly products”); Aaron Cosbey,  The Trade Implications of the Paris 
COP21 Agreement (Commonwealth Secretariat 2016, Working Paper No. 2016/17, 
2016) (noting that while the Paris Agreement does not directly reference trade or 
investment policies, the trade implications of the Agreement are indirect, and will 
be found as opportunities for expanded trade arise to fuel a “global green econo-
my”); Andrew Prag, Trade and SDG 13—Action on Climate Change (Asian Devel-
opment Bank Institute, Working Paper No. 735, 2017) (arguing that increased 
trade can help achieve development goals in a greenhouse-gas-efficient manner, if 
greenhouse gases are efficiently priced globally). 
90  See Joel Trachtman, WTO Law Constraints on Border Tax Adjustment and Tax 
Credit Mechanisms to Reduce the Competitive Effects of Carbon Taxes, (Resources for 
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development goals (SDGs).91  Trade can assist in the achievement 
of the SDGs because it embraces environmental, economic, and so-
cial dimensions.92  This is in line with the commitments of many 
countries to sustainable energy.  However, the governance of trade 
and renewable energy is currently fragmented among many insti-
tutions and legal instruments.  
There is insufficient research on how the trade and renewable 
energy regimes can work together, and on trade’s role in sustaina-
bility.  New agreements have started to include sustainable devel-
opment chapters93 and various think tanks and institutes have be-
                                                                                                                   
the Future, Working Paper No. 16-03, 2016) (discussing questions such as could 
the trade regime be modified to reduce fossil fuel consumption? Should it be?); see 
generally AARON COSBEY ET AL., A GUIDE FOR THE CONCERNED: GUIDANCE ON THE 
ELABORATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF BORDER CARBON ADJUSTMENT (2012) 
(providing guidance on possible border carbon adjustment legislation for policy 
makers); CLIMATE STRATEGIES ET AL., WORKSHOP REPORT: REFORMING FOSSIL FUEL 
SUBSIDIES THROUGH THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS (2017) (de-
scribing a border carbon adjustment: “a measure applied to traded products that 
seeks to make their prices in destination markets reflect the cost they would have 
incurred had they been regulated under the destination market’s greenhouse gas 
emission regime.”). 
91  See G.A. Res. 70/1 (Sept. 25, 2015) (urging states “to refrain from promul-
gating and applying unilateral economic, financial or trade measures not in ac-
cordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations that im-
pede full achievement of the economic and social development, particularly in 
developing countries.”); see also Jeffrey Sachs, Happiness and Sustainable Develop-
ment: Concepts and Evidence in 1 WORLD HAPPINESS REPORT 2016 (John Helliwell et 
al. eds., 2016) (examining how trade freedom contributes to happiness); see also 
AMY CUTTER ET AL., SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND INTEGRATION: 
ACHIEVING A BETTER BALANCE BETWEEN THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSIONS (2017) (comparing how the SDGs connect to Germa-
ny’s national sustainable development).  
92  See Balakrishna Pisupati, UNEP/DELC, Role of Multilateral Environmen-
tal Agreements (MEAs) in Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGS) 8 
(April 2016) (showing there is also literature on how environmental agreements 
can help achieve the sustainable development goals). 
93  See Robert Falkner & Nico Jaspers, Environmental Protection, International 
Trade and the WTO in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE POLICY 245 (Kenneth Heydon & Stephen Woolcock eds., 2012) (discussing 
the general relationship between trade and environment as well as the institution-
al context for trade and environmental policymaking); see also Steve Charnovitz, 
The WTO’s Environmental Progress in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
LAW 249–251 (William J. Davey & John Jackson eds., 2008) (noting that all WTO 
agreements contain trade-related environmental measures, but within these 
agreements there are multiple provisions that specifically address the environ-
ment); see also Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted 
Mar. 12, 2001) (regarding laws prohibiting products containing asbestos); see also 
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gun to discuss this issue,94 but there is no thorough, empirical, the-
oretical study of what impact such sustainable development chap-
ters are having so far, how they can improve, how the two regimes 
operate and can align better, and how to capitalize on trade to 
push forward the renewable energy agenda.95 
 
                                                                                                                   
Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998) (analyzing a 
dispute relating to the United States and implementation of its domestic legisla-
tion, the Clean Air Act); see also Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards 
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted 
Apr. 29, 1996) (illustrating how environmental issues are starting to play a more 
prominent role in the WTO dispute settlement system).  
94  See e.g., David Blandford, International Trade Disciplines and Policy Measures 
to Address Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation in Agriculture, in TACKLING 
AGRICULTURE IN THE POST-BALI CONTEXT: A COLLECTION OF SHORT ESSAYS (Ricardo 
Meléndez-Ortiz et al. eds., 2014) (discussing sustainable development efforts fol-
lowing the WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali); Petros C. Mavroidis & Jaime de 
Melo, Climate Change Policies and the WTO: Greening the GATT, Revisited in 
TOWARDS A WORKABLE AND EFFECTIVE CLIMATE REGIME 225–236 (Scott Barrett et al., 
eds., 2015) (arguing that the ‘negative contract’ in the present WTO does not suf-
fice as a legal constraint to promote climate change-friendly policies because WTO 
members do not have to adopt those kinds of policies themselves); see also Aaditya 
Mattoo & Arvind  Subramanian, Four Changes to Trade Rules to Facilitate Climate 
Change Action, VOX CEPR POLICY PORTAL (May 4, 2013), 
https://voxeu.org/article/four-changes-trade-rules-facilitate-climate-change-
action [https://perma.cc/MDN8-YZME] (illustrating how think tanks and insti-
tutes have begun to address these issues). 
95  See Herman E. Daly, Against Free Trade: Neoclassical and Steady-State 
Perspectives, 5 J. EVOLUTIONARY ECON. 313 (1995) (illustrating how this situation 
raises the question whether climate change demands a normative shift in how we 
think about the trade regime); see also Keiichiro Kanemoto et al., International Trade 
Undermines National Emission Reduction Targets: New Evidence From Air Pollution, 24 
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 52 (2014) (concluding that because current reporting and 
regulatory regimes allow countries in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol to displace 
emissions intensive production offshore, those countries have been able to inaccu-
rately report decreasing emissions); BEN LILLISTON, THE CLIMATE COST OF FREE 
TRADE, INST. FOR AGRIC. AND TRADE POLICY (2016) (arguing that the intentional 
separation of trade goals and environmental goals in the TPP and the Paris 
Agreement is becoming increasingly untenable); see also Kate Gordon & Matthew 
Lewis, It’s Time to Close the ‘Carbon Loophole’, WALL ST. JOURNAL (Nov. 13, 2017), 
https://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2017/11/13/its-time-to-close-the-carbon-
loophole/ [https://perma.cc/2QR3-5P4V] (highlighting the flaw of most coun-
tries’ climate plans: that nations can export high-carbon products without ac-
counting for them in their national climate commitments).  
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6.  FINDING SYNERGISTIC LINKS BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL 
TRADING SYSTEM AND THE CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME 
 
Just decades ago, few people would have thought to place the 
environment in the trade debate.  Today, many people recognize 
that trade and the environment need to be integrated for institu-
tional bureaucratic reasons.  Given the importance of greater coop-
eration between the trading and climate change regimes for a sus-
tainable future, the following questions arise: What trade 
instruments best deal with climate action, bearing in mind that 
there is much public opposition to trade agreements?96  What kind 
of trade regime do we need to create for the great transformation of 
decarbonization?  What should the role of the trading system be in 
reducing fossil-fuel consumption?  In accordance with Article 4.2 
of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change,97 how do the nationally 
determined contributions (NDCs)98 integrate with the trading sys-
tem,99 (taking into account that, unlike trade, they are a global pub-
lic good)?100  What will be the impact for investment flows, say, to 
                                                   
96  See Anabel Gonzalez, Trade Agreements Under Attack: Can They Be Salvaged 
And Is It Worth It?, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 24, 2016), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/anabel-gonzalez/trade-agreements-under-
at_b_12619314.html [https://perma.cc/A2AG-85X2] (outlining the backlash to 
trade agreements). 
97  See Paris Agreement on Climate Change art. 4.2, Dec. 12, 2015, U.N. DOC. 
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 [hereinafter Paris Agreement] (“Each Party shall pre-
pare, communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions 
that it intends to achieve. Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation measures, with 
the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions.”). 
98  See Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), UNITED NATIONS 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https:// unfccc.int/process/the-
paris-agreement/nationally-determined-contributions/ndc-registry 
[https://perma.cc/9TX9-2Q7A] (last visited Sept. 25, 2018) (“NDCs embody ef-
forts by each country to reduce national emissions and adapt to the impacts of 
climate change.”); see also  Paris Agreement, supra note 97, at art. 2 (stating the 
idea with the NDCs is to make sure that the increase in the global average tem-
perature is “well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels.”  But note the NDCs are 
not legally binding).  
99  See Clara Brandi, Strengthening Climate-Friendly Trade Elements in Future 
Nationally Determined Contributions, INT’L CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV. 
(May 10, 2017), https://www.ictsd.org/opinion/strengthening-climate-friendly-
trade-elements-in-future-nationally-determined [https://perma.cc/2T3T-P7X3] 
(linking trade and the NDCs). 
100  See Rafael Leal-Arcas, Sustainability, Common Concern and Public Goods, 49 
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 801 (2017) (discussing global public goods in the context 
of sustainability). 
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expand carbon sinks?101  How can trade policy attract investments 
in climate action?102  How can trade policy help climate action?  
How can fossil fuel subsidies be reconciled with attempts to inte-
grate the trade and climate change regimes?  What is the role of 
fossil fuel subsidies and border tax adjustments103 in this equation?  
Is there a deficiency in WTO law regarding fossil fuel subsidies?104  
Since the trading system should support sustainable development, 
has globalization (personified by the world trading system) been 
delegitimized?  Will greater cooperation between both regimes be 
possible in light of the current political threats to international-
ism?105  Is the fact that the Paris Agreement offers a territorial ap-
proach106 to climate mitigation an issue for international trade?  
How will emerging technologies and business models affect both 
the trade and climate change regimes in the future? 
There are deficiencies and potential tensions when trying to 
work out synergistic links between the trade and climate re-
                                                   
101  See U.N. ENVTL PROGRAMME, THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2017 (2017) (argu-
ing that cutting GHG emissions will not be enough to keep global warming with-
in desired expectations and that GHGs must also be removed from the air).  
102  A case in point here would be a climate-investment facilitation agree-
ment.  See, e.g., WTO, ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS AGREEMENT (EGA), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/ega_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8A8A-4PC3] (representing the closest thing we have to one 
and which is currently being negotiated). 
103  See JOHN S. ODELL, OUR ALARMING CLIMATE CRISIS DEMANDS BORDER 
ADJUSTMENTS NOW (Int’l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Dev. (ICTSD), 2018) 
(discussing border tax adjustments). 
104  See generally Daniel Peat, The Wrong Rules for the Right Energy: the WTO 
SCM Agreement and Subsidies for Renewable Energy, 24 ENVTL. L. & MGMT 3 (2012) 
(arguing the possibilities for addressing subsidies under WTO law in general have 
major limitations). 
105  Examples of political threats to internationalism are Brexit, the US’s with-
drawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and President Trump’s idea of leaving 
the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the world trading system.  President 
Trump is an example of someone de-stabilizing international cooperative struc-
tures in environment, climate change, and trade.  See Shawn Donnan, WTO Faces 
an Identity Crisis as Trump Weighs Going It Alone, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2017),  
https://www.ft.com/content/38c56f52-d9a5-11e7-a039-
c64b1c09b482?desktop=true&conceptId=a208e921-65cb-31b7-8a7c-
3e4d0ddcdb53&segmentId=7c8f09b9-9b61-4fbb-9430-
9208a9e233c8#myft:notification:daily-email:content:headline:html (detailing the 
US’s shift to an antagonistic approach towards the WTO under the Trump admin-
istration). 
106  See Nationally Determined Contributions, supra note 98 (stating that “[e]ach 
climate plan reflects the country’s ambition for reducing emissions, taking into ac-
count its domestic circumstances and capabilities”) (emphasis added).  
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gimes.107  For instance, the term ‘trade’ does not appear in the Paris 
Agreement on Climate Change.  In fact, the Paris Agreement in-
corporates few trade-related elements such as technology trans-
fer108 and renewable energy.109  Moreover, updating110 the NDCs 
may lead to tensions because of the process and production meth-
ods and to intergovernmental trade disputes at the WTO.  In addi-
tion, it is often the case that officials at trade ministries do not have 
a mindset for the environment, which makes synergies between 
trade and climate change more challenging.111 
Arguably, much of the difficulty with greater cooperation be-
tween trade and climate change is that the so-called ‘trade-in’ is-
sues (such as trade in goods or trade-in services) are about the re-
duction or elimination of barriers to trade, whereas the so-called 
‘trade and’ issues (such as trade and climate change) are about 
regulatory coherence.  Any future climate action will need to be 
consistent with the WTO.  In this sense, former Chairman of the 
WTO Appellate Body James Bacchus has argued that “to combine 
the most benefit for the climate with the least risk to trade, a WTO 
climate waiver is urgently needed”112 so that “WTO members re-
                                                   
107  More broadly, for an analysis of integrating sustainable development 
with other themes, see Edith Brown Weiss, The Evolution of International Environ-
mental Law., 54 JAPANESE Y.B. INT’L L. 1 (2011) (discussing the development and 
evolution of international environmental law from 1900 to 2012); PHILIPPE SANDS 
ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (3rd ed., 2012) (examin-
ing the inter-linkages between international environmental law and other areas of 
international regulation); Joseph L. Sax, Environmental. Law at the Turn of the Cen-
tury: A Reportorial Fragment of Contemporary History, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2375 (2000) 
(discussing the development of environmental law during the early 2000s, focus-
ing primarily on the Endangered Species Act). 
108  Paris Agreement, supra note 97, at art. 6.8. 
109  Paris Agreement, supra note 97.  
110  See Nationally Determined Contributions, supra note 98 (“The Paris Agree-
ment requests each country to outline and communicate their post-2020 climate 
actions, known as their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).”). 
111  See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., PERU TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT, 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa 
[https://perma.cc/FQL4-R6WN] (describing how Peru has a ministry for the en-
vironment as a result of the 2009 US-Peru Free Trade Agreement).  
112  See James Bacchus, The Case for a WTO Climate Waiver, CTR. FOR INT’L 
GOVERNANCE INNOVATION (Nov. 2, 2017), 
https://www.cigionline.org/publications/case-wto-climate-
waiver?utm_source=climate-l&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=cop23 
[https://perma.cc/BF4S-D24D] (discussing looming collision between the rules 
frameworks of the two separate international institutions that have been created 
and entrusted with addressing trade and climate change). 
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vise and realign WTO rules in accordance with the objectives of 
sustainable development.”113  In addition, adding environmental 
and social issues to the WTO agenda might give the WTO more le-
gitimacy,114 presenting the WTO as an evolutionary body of law 
that may go beyond trade, classifying it as ‘regime extension.’115  
Other possible solutions are the removal of impediments in the ex-
isting law as well as the gradual phase-out and eventual prohibi-
tion of fossil fuel subsidies.116  Litigation at the WTO will most like-
ly not move forward many of these difficulties.  
Rather, constructive regulation through plurilateral agreements 
to develop regulation on emerging technologies, carbon capture 
and storage, batteries, and similar topics may be a more fruitful 
way forward.  Much of the analysis thus far on how the trade and 
climate regimes can better work together has been done at the mul-
tilateral level.  There is a need to think about the regime complex as 
well.117  To do so, political will is necessary, which one can create 
through leadership.  Ultimately, nature, technology, and science 
will make a difference.  Moreover, tensions between the trade re-
                                                   
113  Id. 
114  See Daniel C. Esty, The World Trade Organization’s Legitimacy Crisis, 1 
WORLD TRADE REV. 7, 7-22 (2002) (highlighting challenges the WTO faces in de-
fending its legitimacy and exploring economic integration as a solution to the 
WTO’s legitimacy problems). 
115  Adding non-economic issues to the WTO agenda creates a legitimacy-
enhancing effect of addressing these problems that clearly matter to the people 
who are now challenging the validity of the WTO’s objectives.  The counterargu-
ment, however, would be whether economists and trade law professionals have 
the necessary tools to tackle environmental and social concerns. 
116  See Who We Work With, GLOBAL SUBSIDIES INITIATIVE, 
https://www.iisd.org/gsi/about/who-we-work-with/friends-fossil-fuel-
subsidy-reform [https://perma.cc/D78K-PHEL] (detailing a partnership with the 
Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform, “a group of countries committed to sup-
porting the reform of inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies”).  Some international organ-
izations have studied the cost of energy subsidies.  See IMF Survey: Counting the 
Cost of Energy Subsidies, INT’L MONETARY FUND (July 17, 2015),  
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sonew070215a 
[https://perma.cc/NW8Y-9ZEW] (detailing a study on the costs of energy subsi-
dies implemented by countries in 2015); see also IPEK GENCSU ET AL., PHASE-OUT 
2020: MONITORING EUROPE'S FOSSIL FUEL SUBSIDIES (2017) (analyzing and reporting 
the findings of a study by the Overseas Development Institute on the social cost of 
fossil fuel subsidies). 
117  See Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate 
Change, 9 PERSP. ON POL.  7 (2011) (arguing that the diverse range of institutions 
involved in climate change governance constitutes a regime complex, which has 
advantages and disadvantages compared to a unitary international regime).  
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gime and the environmental regime are also due to the fact that the 
two regimes do not share a common language.  Trade is mainly 
concerned with the market and is a field in which governments are 
strongly influenced by business and industry groups.  In contrast, 
the environmental regime is concerned mainly with regulation. 
Another way forward would be the support of the green infant 
industry.  Doing so would generate green jobs and would translate 
into climate action without having to import green goods.  Fur-
thermore, creative avenues for international dialogue between fi-
nance and climate change ministers, instead of trade and climate 
ministers, is very promising, especially as countries start to feel the 
economic effects of climate change and extreme weather.  Moreo-
ver, since the WTO is a member-driven institution, it is relevant in 
the trade-climate debate to pay close attention to the domestic poli-
tics and policies of WTO member states that are major GHG emit-
ters, followed up with individualized action plans on how to ad-
dress the issue in each of these countries and link the debate to the 
investment system.  The investment regime is relevant in the 
broader political economy of this debate to address the clean-
energy agenda, climate infrastructure, company sustainability, and 
eco-system protection.  In addition, carbon pricing, not trade, is 
one of the main issues in the climate change mitigation debate, to 
reach the social cost of GHG emissions.118 
                                                   
118  Even the US Supreme Court ruled in 2007 that GHGs are a risk to human 
health.  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding that the EPA could 
regulate GHGs as they pose a threat to public health or welfare).  There is a vast 
body of literature on the links between human rights and environmental protec-
tion.  See also Gunther Handl, Human Rights and Protection of the Environment, in 
ECON., SOC. AND CULTURAL RTS.: A TEXTBOOK 303 (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 2nd ed. 
2001) (addressing the question of whether a relationship exists between the pro-
tection of the environment and the protection of human rights); SVITLANA 
KRAVCHENKO & JOHN E. BONINE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES, 
LAW AND POLICY 549 (2008) (examining the role of different human rights laws in 
dealing with climate change); Ben Pontin, Environmental Rights under the UK's In-
termediate Constitution, 17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 21 (2002) (providing a sum-
mary and analysis of environmental rights within the UK); Emilio Padilla, Inter-
generational Equity and Sustainability, 41 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 69 (2002) (analyzing 
methods of sustainable development with consideration to both present and fu-
ture generations); Francesco Bosello et al., Economy-wide Estimates of the Implica-
tions of Climate Change: Human Health, 58 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 579 (2006) (studying 
the economic impacts climate change as on human health); Jon Barnett & W. Neil 
Adger, Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict, 26 POL. GEOGRAPHY 
639, 639 (2007) (analyzing research on the threats climate change poses to human 
security and the capacity of states); Shubhankar Dam & Vivek Tewary, Polluting 
Environment, Polluting Constitution: Is a 'Polluted' Constitution Worse Than a Polluted 
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Below is a list of recommendations for how the trade and cli-
mate regimes can better cooperate:119  
6.1.  Minimize conflicts between the trade and climate regimes 
 
Making greater use of existing fora, such as the Committee on 
Trade and Environment at the WTO Secretariat, is very promising.  
One could also explore the role for a mandatory climate dispute 
settlement mechanism in the UN Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change and in other international climate agreements.  
Equally, it may be worth proposing tough environmental trade 
regulations given that very few dispute settlement cases related to 
environmental restrictions have been successful and such cases 
take years to adjudicate. 
Moreover, one could make an exception to the most-favored-
nation (MFN)120 and national-treatment (NT)121 principles of non-
discrimination for policy objectives, e.g., climate change mitigation.  
This could be the drafting of WTO norms to not impose duties on 
renewables.  In addition, one could establish a “peace clause” for 
climate action.  Similar to the WTO’s Agriculture Agreement, the 
                                                                                                                   
Environment?, 17 J. ENVTL. L. 383 (2005) (analyzing the impact of environmental 
regulation and laws within Indian Supreme Court decisions and constitution); 
Edward Cameron, Development, Climate Change and Human Rights: From the Mar-
gins to the Mainstream?, (World Bank Soc. Dev., Working Paper No. 123, 2011) (ex-
ploring how communities vulnerable to the negative impacts of climate change 
have used human rights as a strategy to push for advances in climate change re-
search and policy); Rosemary G. Rayfuse & Emily Crawford, Climate Change, Sov-
ereignty and Statehood, (U. of Sydney L Sch., Legal Studies Res. Paper No. 11/59, 
2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1931466 (examining 
the threats climate change poses and their effect on the international law on state-
hood). 
119  See JAMES BACCHUS ET AL., GLOBAL RULES FOR MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE AND 
REINFORCING TRADE AND CLIMATE REGIMES (2016), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/E15/WEF_Climate_Change_POP.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SU73-NRFM] (discussing policy options for mutually support-
ive regimes). 
120  See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. I, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (defining the Most-Favored-Nation-
Treatment as the principle of not discrimination between one’s trading partners).  
See also General Agreement on Trade in Services art. II, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 
U.N.T.S 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 [hereinafter GATS]; Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights art. IV, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [here-
inafter TRIPS] (reiterating the concept of the Most-Favored-Nation-Treatment). 
121  See GATT, supra note 120, at art. III (defining the National Treatment Ob-
ligation as principle of giving others the same treatment as one’s own nationals).  
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peace clause would enable countries to protect themselves from ac-
tion taken against each other’s fossil fuel subsidies.122  In general, 
although the trade regime does not seem to be an obstacle to cli-
mate change action per se, it is also not driving such action.  There-
fore, the international community should re-gear the trade regime 
to incentivize innovation and capital flow toward sustainability in-
itiatives.  
6.2.  Revisit the concept of “like” products 
 
One could establish an international standard for calculating 
the amount of carbon used in the making of products.  In addition, 
it would be desirable to agree on a “waiver” from WTO obligations 
for all trade-restrictive climate measures that are based on the 
amount of carbon used in making a product. 
 
6.3.  Climate action via the formation of climate clubs 
 
An option to be explored is plurilateral action to promote green 
technology transfer among club members –e.g., G20, G7, the Major 
Economies Forum, participation of cities (C40), namely a group of 
90+ of the largest cities in the world for the implementation of the 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change.  In addition, climate 
measures pursuant to a climate agreement should fall within the 
scope of Article XX(b) and (g) of the GATT and of Article XIV of 
the GATS (i.e., the general exceptions).  Moreover, one could en-
visage granting a waiver for a climate club organized outside the 
WTO framework to become a plurilateral agreement under the 
WTO Agreement.  
A club approach would overcome free-riding issues of climate 
change mitigation (e.g., the EU and NATO as examples of clubs 
where only members have benefits).  This area is of great im-
                                                   
122  For an overview of global energy subsidies, see Energy Subsidies, INT’L 
ENERGY AGENCY (Oct. 3, 2018), 
www.iea.org/statistics/resources/energysubsidies/ [https://perma.cc/2UE9-
ALZA] (breaking down data of energy subsidies by country and fossil fuel type in 
2016).  See also Benjamin K. Sovacool, Reviewing, Reforming, and Rethinking Global 
Energy Subsidies: Towards a Political Economy Research Agenda, 135 ECOLOGICAL 
ECON. 150 (2017) (reviewing the basic principles of global energy subsidies and 
highlighting the net costs of these subsidies to society overall).  
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portance because, despite all the progress in scientific and econom-
ic understanding of climate change, achieving international agree-
ments on climate change has proven difficult because of the threat 
of free-riding.  In addition, a carbon price, rather than carbon emis-
sion reduction requirements, should be a core element of this cli-
mate-club approach because states are more likely to reach agree-
ment on a carbon price than on carbon emission reduction levels.  
Ideally, carbon prices should reach a level up to that of the social 
cost of GHG emissions. 
 
6.4.  An agreed framework for a global Emissions Trading System and 
border measures 
 
The idea is to ensure that WTO rules apply to a global emis-
sions trading system and to ensure that a carbon tax is an indirect 
tax on a product that is eligible for a “border tax adjustment” un-
der Article II:2(a) of the GATT.  Border tax adjustments can be per-
ceived as a carrot to avoid or minimize a loss of economic competi-
tiveness and to avoid carbon leakage, or as a stick to spur climate 
action.  
 
6.5.  Shift subsidies from fossil fuels to renewable energy 
 
The international community is not penalizing pollution; ra-
ther, it is subsidizing it via fossil fuel subsidies.  So, the interna-
tional community should agree on the gradual phase-out and 
eventual prohibition of fossil-fuel subsidies.  If we are serious 
about climate change mitigation, fossil fuel subsidies must come to 
an end and green industrial policy tools (i.e., renewable energy 
subsidies, specific performance requirements, technical standards, 
and local content requirements) must take priority.123  We should 
                                                   
123  The international community should find ways to reduce both the strong 
influence wielded by industries benefiting from fossil fuel subsidies and the hesi-
tance of political leaders, even those generally committed to environmental issues, 
to take a stand publicly despite growing awareness of such measures’ economic 
and environmental repercussions.  For a study on the benefits of fuel subsidies, see 
David Coady et al., The Unequal Benefits of Fuel Subsidies Revisited: Evidence for De-
veloping Countries (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/15/250), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp15250.pdf (analyzing the 
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also allow only non-discriminatory purchases of climate-friendly 
environmental goods and services under the WTO Government 
Procurement Agreement (GPA) while encouraging more WTO 
Members to accede to that Agreement.124  Finally, subsidies should 
go to the renewable-energy industry to make the transition to a 
green economy a reality.  The need is great, but the science is nas-
cent and economic incentives in the market are still missing.  Gov-
ernments can play a role here through subsidies and green taxes.125 
 
6.6.  Foster sectoral approaches such as aviation and shipping 
 
Climate agreements affecting trade made by organizations such 
as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) should be upheld in 
WTO dispute settlement by WTO Members that are parties to 
those agreements.  In addition, one could improve the fuel efficien-
cy of new and existing ships and planes via electric engines.  Elec-
tric or hybrid engines in aviation and shipping would be very ef-
fective for climate change mitigation.  For instance, hybrid planes, 
with a capacity of 100 passengers, could take off and land using jet 
engines but during the cruise they could make use of electrically-
powered engines.  Similarly, lighter electric engines for aviation 
have been developed. 
In fact, aviation would be an interesting sector for the fight 
                                                                                                                   
benefits of fuel price subsidies and welfare impact, particularly among developing 
countries).  See also Peter Wooders & Cleo Verkuijl, Making the International Trade 
System Work for Climate Change: Five Ways to Address Fossil Fuel Subsidies through the 
WTO and International Trade Agreements, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (June 20, 
2017), https://www.iisd.org/blog/making-international-trade-system-work-
climate-change-five-ways-address-fossil-fuel [https://perma.cc/45XB-
YE8T](exploring the use of fossil fuel subsidies to complement and strengthen 
climate change reformation efforts and agreements). 
124  See Agreement on Government Procurement, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7T72-ZVLS] (stating that as the date of publication of this arti-
cle, the GPA comprises only 47 WTO members out of 164 members).  
125  That said, Germany has invested $1trn on low-carbon electricity and yet 
still depends at 50% on fossil fuels for its power.  See “Negative-Emissions Tech-
nology: What They Don’t Tell You About Climate Change,” THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 
18, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/11/16/what-they-dont-
tell-you-about-climate-change [perma.cc/Y9NF-WR6R] (describing the incentives 
governments can provide to mine CO2 from the atmosphere, if the market de-
mand is not enough). 
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against climate change if we could manage to use battery powered 
planes.  The main issue is that battery-powered engines weigh 
more than jet engines.126  But there are advantages to using electric 
motors rather than jet engines: they are lighter and more energy-
efficient.127  Flight tests are set to begin in 2020 with the goal of a 
hybrid-electric airliner with a capacity of 50-100 passengers enter-
ing the market in 2030.128 
7.  FORUM FOR ACTION:  EXPLORING THE CLUB-OPTION AND BEYOND 
 
There are several options to push forward the trade agenda for 
climate action and sustainable energy.  
 
7.1.  Multilateralism 
 
Multilateralism, in terms of trade liberalization, has been in de-
cline for some time.129  A case in point is the Doha Development 
Agenda, which was initiated in 2001 but never concluded.130  In the 
case of multilateral trade, the Trump administration questions its 
validity and the WTO’s way of settling disputes,131 where “frustra-
                                                   
126  That said, there are already companies that make two-seater electric train-
ing planes.  See Julia Hetz, Airbus, Rolls-Royce, and Siemens to Develop Flying De-
monstrator, SIEMENS  (Nov. 28, 2017), 
(https://www.siemens.com/innovation/en/home/pictures-of-the-
future/mobility-and-motors/the-future-of-mobility-e-fan-x.html) 
[https://perma.cc/MD6M-NTTY] (announcing the plan to make the E-Fan X, a 
demo version of a hybrid-electric passenger plane). 
127  See The Electric-Flight Plan: Small Hybrid-Electric Airliners Ready for Take 
Off, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 2, 2017) at 70, https://www.economist.com/science-
and-technology/2017/11/30/small-hybrid-electric-airliners-ready-for-take-off 
[perma.cc/DA6B-U8K6] (claiming that electric motors are 95% more efficient and 
are lighter than jet engines).  
128  Id. at 69–70 (citing a Samsung Electronics statement that, while demon-
strating other growth in the technology industry, it managed to maximize its en-
ergy capacity by 45 percent by incorporating graphene into a lithium-ion battery). 
129  See generally RAFAEL LEAL-ARCAS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
LAW: MULTILATERAL, REGIONAL AND BILATERAL GOVERNANCE (Edward Elgar ed., 
2010) (outlining the decline of international investment agreements). 
130  The Doha Round, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm#development 
[https://perma.cc/DCV4-9K7H]. 
131  The Art of the Impossible: The WTO Remains Stuck in its Rut, THE ECONOMIST 
(Dec. 16, 2017) at 64, https://www.economist.com/finance-and-
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tion has turned to aggression.”132  In fact, Mr. Robert Lighthizer, 
the US trade representative, has suggested a return to the pre-WTO 
system, where “might was right,”133 rather than making use of the 
dispute settlement system to resolve trade disputes.134  One great 
difficulty for the WTO process of creating new agreements is that 
decisions are made by consensus.  In a WTO of 164 members, and 
more to come, such structure does not make decision-making easy. 
In the context of multilateralism, there is a new global agree-
ment to mitigate climate change: the Paris Agreement on Climate 
Change of 2015.135  Two years later, more than 50 world leaders 
met in Paris for the One Planet Summit to launch an ambitious 
project to win the battle against climate change.136  In 2017 the 
World Bank announced that it would stop funding fossil fuel ex-
plorations in two years.137  The consequences of climate change are 
well known and most climate scientists agree that if the global 
temperature continues to increase, there is a serious risk of cata-
strophic sea level rises and more inundations around the world.  It 
is therefore imperative that CO2 emissions be reduced.  In fact, the 
2017 Emissions Gap report of the UN Environment Program states 
                                                                                                                   
economics/2017/12/14/the-wto-remains-stuck-in-its-rut [perma.cc/8CH7-8SSE]. 
132  Disaster Management: The WTO is Under Threat from the Trump Administra-
tion, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 9, 2017) at 19, 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/12/07/the-wto-is-under-threat-
from-the-trump-administration [perma.cc/2ZVW-KCQX].  
133  See also BRINK LINDSEY AND STEVEN TELES, THE CAPTURED ECONOMY: HOW 
THE POWERFUL ENRICH THEMSELVES, SLOW DOWN GROWTH, AND INCREASE 
INEQUALITY (2017) (arguing similarly regarding America’s political dysfunction, 
exploring social problems that result in the rich further entrenching themselves). 
134  Situations Vacant: The World Trade Organization, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 9, 
2017) at 68, https://www.economist.com/finance-and-
economics/2017/12/07/as-wto-members-meet-in-argentina-the-organisation-is-
in-trouble [https://perma.cc/8Q7V-4U8T].  See also DOUGLAS IRWIN, CLASHING 
OVER COMMERCE: A HISTORY OF US TRADE POLICY (2017) (analyzing the history of 
US trade policy and arguing that trade is neither dull nor as bad as people think). 
135  See Michael A. Levi, Two Cheers for the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  (Dec. 12, 2015), https://www.cfr.org/blog/two-
cheers-paris-agreement-climate-change [perma.cc/F6AK-WAYT] (commenting on 
The Paris Agreement, stating that it “is fundamentally different.  All countries, not 
just developed ones, are supposed to curb emissions”). 
136  First One Planet Summit, ONE PLANET SUMMIT, 
https://www.oneplanetsummit.fr/en/events-16/first-one-planet-summit-6 
[https//perma.cc/V36K-JBQM] (last visited Sept. 25, 2018).  
137  Summit-Mania: New Life for the Paris Climate Deal, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 14, 
2017) at 51–52, https://www.economist.com/international/2017/12/14/new-
life-for-the-paris-climate-deal [https://perma.cc/JGU8-M4V8]. 
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that the climate pledges submitted by 164 countries represent 
merely one third of the reduction in GHG emissions needed to 
meet the Paris Agreement target.138  Further complications have 
arisen due to the Trump administration’s announcement that it 
will not honor the nationally determined contributions submitted 
by the Obama administration and it will not pay into the UN’s 
Green Climate Fund, whose purpose is to transfer 100 billion US 
dollars per year to poor countries by 2020.139  
 
7.2.  Plurilateralism 
 
Plurilateralism can ease barriers to trade in environmental 
goods and services.140  For instance, climate clubs (i.e., getting 
countries to join various regimes) could serve as a way to promote 
technology transfer within the club members.141  Clubs of major 
countries (e.g. G-8, G-8+5, G-20, APEC) could serve as a platform 
                                                   
138  See U.N.E.P., The Emissions Gap Report 2017 (Nov. 2017), 
https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/22070/EGR_2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/93HH-8Z73] (detailing the gap between necessary and actual 
emissions reductions). 
139  See Summit-Mania, supra note 137 (describing the problem that while 
commitments to date are only nearing 70 billion US dollars, poor countries have 
made their pledges to the Paris Agreement conditional on rich countries provid-
ing them assistance). 
140  See generally RAFAEL LEAL-ARCAS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
LAW: MULTILATERAL, REGIONAL AND BILATERAL GOVERNANCE (Edward Elgar ed., 
2010) (defining plurilateralism as agreements that are non-binding to parties that 
do not agree to them). 
141  For literature on climate clubs see generally Thomas Brewer, Artic Black 
Carbon from Shipping: A Club Approach to Climate and Trade Governance, ICTSC 
GLOBAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND INSTITUTIONS, Issue Paper No. 4 (Oct. 2015), 
https://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/research/Arctic%20Black%20Carbon
%20from%20Shipping%20-
%20A%20Club%20Approach%20to%20Climate%20and%20Trade%20Governance
%20-%20ICTSD2015_0.pdf (addressing the issue of black carbon problems and 
proposing the formation of a club-like partnership to combat this problem); Jon 
Hovi,  et al., Climate Change Mitigation: A Role for Climate Clubs?, PALGRAVE 
COMMUNICATIONS 2, Article No. 16020 (May 10, 2016), 1–9 
(http://www.nature.com/articles/palcomms201620) [https://perma.cc/CY8G-
2HFC] (exploring climate clubs and their potential usage in climate change miti-
gation); William Nordhaus, Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-Riding in International 
Climate Policy, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1339 (2015) (providing an overview of climate 
clubs and exploring the problems facing climate clubs and their possible solu-
tions). 
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to conclude RTAs in green energy technologies.142  The Environ-
mental Goods Agreement (EGA),143 for example, is a plurilateral144 
trade agreement currently under negotiation between 18 WTO 
Members which would reduce tariffs on environmentally benefi-
cial goods145 in order to stimulate sustainable practices within 
global supply chains.146  The idea is that “there could be a benefit 
for the multilateral trading system in lowering technical barriers to 
trade in energy-related goods and services, including in relation to 
technological goods and services that could encourage the prolifer-
ation of renewables.”147  The advantage of the EGA is that it is a 
                                                   
142  For views on regional integration and climate change see Carlo Carraro, 
Christian Egenhofer, and Noriko Fujiwara, Do Regional Integration Approaches Hold 
Lessons for Climate Change Regime Formation? The Case of Differentiated Integration in 
Europe, in CLIMATE AND TRADE POLICY: BOTTOM-UP APPROACHES TOWARDS GLOBAL 
AGREEMENT (Carlo Carraro & Christian Egenhofer eds., 2007) (stating how 
“[d]espite almost 15 years of negotiations to achieve and implement global cli-
mate change agreement, the international community appears to be still some 
way from a breakthrough.”). 
143  See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS AGREEMENT, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/other-
initiatives/environmental-goods-agreement  [https://perma.cc/GRN8-NH8C] 
(last visited Sept. 25, 2018).  The EGA ended up being an open plurilateral agree-
ment because one needs the consensus of the WTO membership for a closed pluri-
lateral agreement in the context of WTO decision-making.  
144  A plurilateral approach to trade agreements means that the agreements 
are optional and not binding on those WTO members who do not engage in them.  
In the WTO context, multilateral negotiations, as opposed to plurilateral negotia-
tions, imply the participation of all WTO members.  The nature of the consequent 
multilateral agreements from these multilateral negotiations implies that com-
mitments are taken by all the WTO members.  See Rafael Leal-Arcas, The GATS in 
the Doha Round: A European Perspective, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND 
TRADE IN SERVICES 28 (Kern Alexander & Mads Andenas, eds., 2008) (saying that 
the idea behind plurilateral negotiations is to make the WTO deliver again on 
progressive liberalization).   
145  Lower environmental goods tariffs would allow for cheap procurement 
of, say, solar panels and other renewable technologies, thus facilitating a transi-
tion to a clean energy future as fast as possible.  On the other hand, temporarily 
higher tariffs may allow a country to build up, say, a solar industry that will then 
be able to compete on the global market, bringing prices down overall and lead-
ing to further innovation globally. 
146  The 18 WTO members are: Australia, Canada, China, Costa Rica, the Eu-
ropean Union, Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, 
Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), Turkey, 
and the United States.  Leal-Arcas, supra note 144.  All the EU member states are 
represented by the European Union in the negotiations, which means that there is 
a total of forty-six WTO member states represented in the Environmental Goods 
Agreement (EGA). 
147  Rafael Leal-Arcas, How Governing Int’l Trade in Energy Can Enhance EU 
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plurilateral agreement that extends concessions to all WTO mem-
bers on an MFN basis once adopted.  
Combined, the parties represented at the EGA discussions pro-
duce 90% of environmental goods.148  Since tariffs are already very 
low in many countries, the issue with the EGA is mainly about 
non-tariff barriers.  Much of the issue with the EGA is defining 
what an environmental good is.  Even if a trade agreement can be 
formed with explicit environmental objectives, arguably, the fact 
that the EGA has stalled is detrimental in that it is evidence that 
the international trade regime has little to offer sustainability ef-
forts and is thus disconnected from the Paris Agreement.   
Also in the trade context, RTAs are examples of trade clubs, of-
fering the advantage of preferential treatment in trade without 
penalties, in accordance with GATT Article XXIV.  A joint state-
ment by the United States, the EU, and Japan at the 11th WTO 
Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires in December 2017 pledging 
“to enhance trilateral cooperation in the WTO” shows that plurilat-
eralism is a strong alternative to multilateralism.149  Another exam-
ple of plurilateralism being on the rise is the fact that a coalition of 
countries has signed up for the negotiation of new rules on e-
commerce plurilaterally.150  So long as there is critical mass, such a 
deal would be possible if there is no discrimination against other 
WTO members. 
In the context of climate change, there is hardly any interna-
tional cooperation in that countries do what they think is best for 
them, as opposed to what is good for the world as a whole.  Inter-
national climate agreements offer no incentives for countries to go 
beyond what is in their self-interest, which explains the lack of in-
ternational climate cooperation.  An example is Canada’s with-
                                                                                                                   
Energy Security, 6 RENEWABLE ENERGY L. AND POL’Y REV. 202, 203 (2015). 
148  Environmental Goods Agreement, TRANSPORT AND ENVIRONMENT, at 1 (2015) 
https://www.transportenvironment.org/sites/te/files/publications/2015%2009
%20TE_EGA%20briefing%20note_FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/Q622-JWRQ]. 
149  Press Release, USTR, Joint Statement by the United States, European Un-
ion and Japan at MC11 (Dec. 12, 2017), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/december/joint-statement-united-states 
[https://perma.cc/F8HL-3HPH]. 
150  See Luc Cohen, Some WTO Members to Push for E-Commerce Rules as Broad-
er Deal Fails, CNBC (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/13/reuters-
america-some-wto-members-to-push-for-e-commerce-rules-as-broader-deal-
fails.html [https://perma.cc/X2WA-UNV8] (noting that a group of 70 WTO 
countries pledged to work toward new electronic commerce trade rules). 
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drawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011 without legal consequenc-
es, which weakened both the environmental effectiveness and le-
gitimacy of the Kyoto Protocol regime.151  The current legal instru-
ments are not enough for what the international community needs 
to solve the climate change issue. 
A solution would be to find a mechanism where countries want 
to join the club and no country wants to leave.  That would mean 
offering benefits to the club members,152 where the negatives be-
come positives, and where the members can exclude others, who 
themselves do not wish to join the club.153  To be in the club, one 
would need participation and compliance.154  Such a situation 
would create stable coalitions.  Economic theory and empirical ev-
idence show that stable coalitions with substantial emissions 
abatement are not likely to form without sanctions against non-
participants. 
Arguably, in the case of climate change agreements, they are 
doomed to failure because there is no incentive to remain a Con-
tracting Party to the agreements, as there is no penalty if a country 
chooses to withdraw from the agreement.  Equally, there is no pun-
ishment if a Contracting Party does not comply with the agree-
ment.  So a future club for climate mitigation could be construed as 
one that offers benefits for joining, but there would be no punish-
ment if countries wish not to join.  
Three characteristics appear evident for the creation of a suc-
cessful climate club: 
 
1. Most big GHG emitters need to be members of the club; 
2. Membership benefits are a must, and they should outweigh 
obligations; and 
                                                   
151  See Canada Pulls out of Kyoto Protocol, THE GUARDIAN, December 13, 2011, 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/dec/13/canada-pulls-out-
kyoto-protocol [https://perma.cc/AST8-635R] (citing Canada’s legal right to 
withdraw). 
152  See Michael Tomz, Judith Goldstein, & Douglas Rivers, Membership Has Its 
Privileges: The Impact of the GATT on International Trade (2007), 
https://web.stanford.edu/~tomz/pubs/TGR2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7P4-
PAEK] (describing the benefits offered to members of GATT). 
153  For further details on the economic theories of clubs, see James Buchanan, 
An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA NEW SERIES 1 (1965) (developing a 
general theory of consumption ownership-membership agreements, or clubs). 
154  A simple example of compliance would be a speeding ticket: if the speed-
ing ticket is very high, the driver will be very careful not to go beyond the speed 
limit and would therefore comply with the law. 
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3. The club would need to be related to sanctions for non-
compliance.155 
 
Who might be the right institution to host such a climate club?  
The WTO?  The Organization for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD)?  The Major Economies Forum on Energy and 
Climate (MEF) could well be a good platform to link clean energy, 
climate action and international trade.156  It was initiated in 2007 by 
the Bush administration under the name “Major Emitters Fo-
rum”157 and launched by the Obama administration on March 28, 
2009. 
The MEF is intended to facilitate a candid dialogue among ma-
jor developed and developing economies, help generate the politi-
cal leadership necessary to achieve a successful outcome at future 
UN climate change conferences, and advance the exploration of 
concrete initiatives and joint ventures that increase the supply of 
clean energy while cutting GHG emissions.158 
The MEF partners include: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, 
the EU, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, Russia, South Africa, the UK, and the US159  Bringing to-
                                                   
155  One would need to make sure that such sanctions would not violate in-
ternational law and/or WTO legal rules. 
156  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, MAJOR ECONOMIES FORUM ON ENERGY AND CLIMATE, 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/oes/climate/mem/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/VH36-KVLB]. 
157  The name was changed because, according to the members, the initial 
name sounded like an oligopoly of polluters.  The MEF has gone through a num-
ber of name changes.  Other proposed names were the Major Economies Process 
on Energy Security and Climate Change and Major Economies Meeting on Energy 
Security and Climate Change. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, MAJOR ECONOMIES PROCESS ON 
ENERGY SECURITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE, http://2001-
2009.state.gov/g/oes/climate/mem/index.htm [https://perma.cc/JM6B-HB2E]; 
THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: MAJOR ECONOMIES MEETING ON ENERGY SECURITY 
AND CLIMATE CHANGE, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/09/20070927.html 
[https://perma.cc/5VJD-HJDB]. 
158  See R. Stewart, et al, Strategic Analytics for Building a Global Climate Regime 
Bottom-Up, at 4–5, paper presented at the conference ‘Reaching International Co-
operation on Climate Change Mitigation,’ (December 21-23, 2011) (advocating for 
a bottom-up approach that incentivizes greenhouse gas reduction as a byproduct 
of other economic goals). 
159  See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MAJOR ECONOMIES BUSINESS FORUM, 
http://www.majoreconomiesforum.org/about/descriptionpurpose.html 
[https://perma.cc/YF7P-9FHN] (providing a forum for multi-sectoral business 
organizations from major economies to discuss climate change).  
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gether these major emitters, which were responsible for around 75 
per cent of GHG emissions in the world as of 2009 (these numbers 
include land-use change),160 will increase the likelihood of reaching 
a climate change agreement, as the MEF is a more efficient and ef-
fective negotiating forum than the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC).161  Even bringing together the six ma-
jor emitters, responsible for 60% of global GHG emissions, will be 
very beneficial for climate action.162  As a platform for action, the 
MEF carries legitimacy: it represents 80% of global GHG emissions, 
80% of the world’s GDP, and 80% of the world’s population.163 
The MEF fosters technological innovation, brought about by in-
creased trade.164  To avoid the obstacles faced by the UNFCCC ma-
chinery, the MEF should focus on each member’s economic weight, 
GHG emissions reduction responsibilities, and the calculation of 
responsibility for GHG emissions such as sharing the burden 
equally between producers and consumers, in order to fairly de-
cide who should reduce GHG emissions and by how much.  For 
instance, most GHGs are emitted because countries do not have 
clean sources of energy.  They have no choice but to use available 
technologies.  If energy-producing countries have to pay 50 per 
cent of the cost, there would be a greater incentive to shift energy 
production from fossil fuels to clean energy.  Investing in clean en-
ergy would then enhance innovation, which is beneficial for the 
economy.165 
                                                   
160  John M. Broder, Clinton Says U.S. is Ready to Lead on Climate, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 27, 2009), http://nyti.ms/huEbYb [https://perma.cc/QX25-D9ZL]. 
161  See Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy, 38 WORLD POL. 
21 (1985) (“The creation of rules of thumb and mechanisms of collective enforce-
ment and the maintenance and administration of regimes can demand an extraor-
dinary degree of cooperation.”). 
162  See, e.g., Dina Cappiello, These 6 Countries Are Responsible For 60% Of CO2 
Emissions, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 5, 2014), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/these-6-countries-are-responsible-for-60-of-
co2-emissions-2014-12 [https://perma.cc/L926-U36T] (suggesting that the future 
of the planet will be shaped by the emissions decisions of China, the United 
States, India, Russia, Japan, and Germany). 
163  See RAFAEL LEAL-ARCAS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 337-
338 (Edward Elgar ed., 2013) (discussing differences between MEF and the Kyoto 
Protocol as a means to respond to climate change). 
164  Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, Technology Action Plan—
Executive Summary (Dec. 2009), 
http://www.majoreconomiesforum.org/images/stories/documents/MEF%20Ex
ec%20Summary%2014Dec2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/R66R-CKPX]. 
165  See LEAL-ARCAS, supra note 163, at 338 (discussing differences between 
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7.3.  Bilateralism 
 
Bilateralism, which should be understood as complementary to 
multilateralism and not mutually exclusive, has been very con-
structive in clean-energy terms, e.g., US-China relations (the G2).  
Since a few years now, the US and China166 have made remarkable 
advancement on energy- and climate-related cooperation.  The 
United States and China are already cooperating on a number of 
joint efforts over clean technology, which plays a major role in the 
relations of the two countries.  Below are a few:167 
 
1. The United States-China Clean Energy Research Center, 
2. The United States-China Energy-Efficient Buildings, 
3. The United States-China Electric Vehicles, 
4. The 21st Century Coal Program, 
5. The China Greentech Initiative, 
6. The United States Alliances in Chinese Cleantech Industry, 
7. The United States-China Renewable Energy Partnership, 
8. The United States-China Energy Cooperation Program, and 
9. The U.S.-China Regional Cooperation Initiatives. 
 
In the trade front, bilateralism seems to be beneficial for the big 
party in a bilateral trade negotiation because it is able to bully the 
other country.  However, higher tariffs mean that prices would rise 
for the consumers of the country that raises the tariffs.  For in-
stance, exports that depend on imported components would be-
come less competitive.  
                                                                                                                   
MEF and the Kyoto Protocol as a means to respond to climate change). 
166  In fact, China leads the world in clean energy.  In recent years, China has 
spent more on cleaning up its energy system than the United States and the Euro-
pean Union combined.  See “The East is Green,” THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 17, 2018, at 
8 (noting that China leads the world in clean energy).  A case in point is the fact 
that China sells more electric vehicles than the rest of the world.  See 
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, GLOBAL EV OUTLOOK 2017, 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/GlobalEVOutlo
ok2017.pdf, at 5 [https://perma.cc/46TC-CUE5] (stating that China accounted for 
more than 40% of the electric cars sold in the world, which is more than double 
the amount sold in the United States).  
167  For further details on the impact and scope of collaboration between the 
US and China in climate negotiations, see LEAL-ARCAS, supra note 163, at 333-336. 
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7.4.  Unilateralism 
 
There have also been unilateral, sector-specific attempts to mit-
igate climate change using trade as a tool.  For example, the EU has 
tried to include aviation in the Emissions Trading System.  
 
7.5.  Vertical policy-making  
 
Very promising is the idea of going beyond a horizontal (inter-
governmental) approach to policy-making so that the international 
community starts exploring vertical approaches168 too (i.e., the in-
volvement of cities through their mayors, NGOs, and of states 
through their governors,169 companies).170  At the Conferences of 
the Parties (COPs), there is the issue of physical design when the 
international community is serious about engaging non-state actors 
in the negotiations.171  At the moment, the structure is such that on-
                                                   
168  See, e.g., AMERICA’S PLEDGE, https://www.americaspledgeonclimate.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/5N8B-YHCK]  (last visited Sept. 25, 2018) (consisting of a 
number of the US cities, states, businesses, and universities that have reaffirmed 
their commitment to helping America reach its Paris climate goals). 
169  See, e.g., UNITED STATES CLIMATE ALLIANCE, 
https://www.usclimatealliance.org/ [https://perma.cc/X73B-RZ8P] (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2018) (detailing the bipartisan coalition of states in the US committed to 
implementing the objectives of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change within 
their borders).    
170  See generally David G. Victor, Three-Dimensional Climate Clubs: Implications 
for Climate Cooperation and the G20, Geneva: International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (Aug. 2017),  
https://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/research/three-
dimensional_climate_clubs_and_the_g20-david_victor.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A8D6-YWR7] (outlining the potential benefits of 3D climate 
clubs in combatting climate change issues national governments have been unable 
to address).   
171  See Mike Bloomberg, Mike Bloomberg Delivers Remarks on America's Pledge 
at COP23 (Nov. 11, 2017), https://www.mikebloomberg.com/news/mike-
bloomberg-delivers-remarks-americas-pledge-cop23-bonn-germany-saturday-
november-11th-2017/ [https://perma.cc/KR7N-WQCA] (transcribing Mike 
Bloomberg’s address at COP23, where he reaffirmed America’s pledge to combat 
climate change at the state-level in light of uncertainty of commitment by the fed-
eral government).  To watch the remarks of former New York mayor Michael 
Bloomberg and California Governor Jerry Brown regarding the first America’s 
Pledge report, which details how the US cities, states and businesses can continue 
to make progress on climate change mitigation regardless of the US federal level 
of governance, see Bloomberg Philanthropies, America’s Pledge at COP23, YOUTUBE, 
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ly governments are participants in the climate change negotiations.  
In this respect, we have recently seen the relevant work of C40 Cit-
ies172 and R20 regions of climate action outside the COPs.173   
In fact, in December 2017, city leaders from different parts of 
the world met in Chicago, invited by its mayor, to discuss how cit-
ies could implement the Paris Agreement.174  As of December 2017, 
California governor Jerry Brown was planning for an equally in-
novative summit to mitigate climate change at the sub-national 
level.175  All these sub-national green efforts are most welcome.   
 
7.6.  Regionalism 
 
Finally, regionalism seems to be on the rise,176 certainly since 
the decline of multilateralism.177  The number of RTAs has in-
creased considerably since right before the creation of the WTO in 
1995.  This phenomenon has created the so-called spaghetti 
bowl.178  Adjustments by just a few major GHG emitters179 and just 
                                                                                                                   
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gXyFW9_EJ_U (last visited Sep. 25, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/6ZVB-FX4Q]. 
172  C40 CITIES, http://www.c40.org/ (last visited 4 November 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/J53Q-WNQ9].   
173  REGIONS OF CLIMATE ACTION, http://regions20.org/ (last visited 4 No-
vember 2017) [https://perma.cc/8EPB-X2QN].   
174  Summit-Mania, supra note 137, at 57.   
175  Id.   
176  See generally Jagdish Bhagwati, US Trade Policy: The Infatuation with FTAs, 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, No. 726 (1995), available at 
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/libraries/inside/working/Econ/ldpd_econ_9495
_726.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RFU-T6HJ] (analyzing and cautioning against cur-
rent policy of further expanding and creating FTA); Scott L. Baier et al., Do Eco-
nomic Integration Agreements Actually Work? Issues in Understanding the Causes and 
Consequences of the Growth of Regionalism, 31 THE WORLD ECON. 461 (2008) (review-
ing the effectiveness of economic integration agreements and analyzing the im-
pact of the growth of regionalism on international trade agreements).   
177  See generally Thomas Risse, The Diffusion of Regionalism, Regional Institu-
tions, Regional Governance, originally presented at the EUSA 2015 Conference in 
March 2015, later included in TANJA A. BÖRZEL, THOMAS RISSE, OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF COMPARATIVE REGIONALISM 88 (2016) (reviewing the concepts and exploring 
theories of the rise of regional organizations); Rafael Leal-Arcas, Proliferation of Re-
gional Trade Agreements: Complementing or Supplanting Multilateralism?, 11 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 597 (2011) (reviewing the rise of regionalism and regional trade agree-
ments and their impacts on and relationship with multilateral trade agreements).   
178  See generally Jagdish Bhagwati, Regionalism versus Multilateralism, 15 THE 
WORLD ECON. 535 (1992) (reviewing the history of regionalism, including its recent 
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three mega-RTAs (namely the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership (TTIP), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP))180 can 
make a great contribution towards climate change mitigation and 
the enhancement of sustainable energy.181   
The evidence for this claim is that RTAs have often served as 
laboratories for covering new disciplines that do not exist in the 
WTO context.182  Moreover, RTAs today cover many topics well 
beyond trade:  competition, investment, environmental protection, 
natural resources, intellectual property rights, labor rights, and so 
forth.183  Since most of the contracting parties to these three mega-
                                                                                                                   
rise, and contrasting it with multilateralism in international trade agreements).   
179  According to the World Resources Institute, based on cumulative emis-
sion which describes a country’s total historic emission, almost half of the global 
emission of greenhouse gases comes from four parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, namely China, the United States, the 
European Union, and India.  See Mengpin Ge et al., 6 Graphs Explain the World’s 
Top 10 Emitters, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE (Nov. 25, 2014), 
https://www.wri.org/blog/2014/11/6-graphs-explain-world%E2%80%99s-top-
10-emitters [https://perma.cc/4A9B-496W].   
180  That said, since early 2018, the TPP has had a new name (the US with-
drew from it in early 2017), the RCEP has come to a halt, and the TTIP negotia-
tions are frozen.  For the TTIP negotiations, see Philip Blenkinsop, U.S. Trade Talks 
in Deep Freeze After Trump Win, Says EU, REUTERS (Nov. 11, 2016),  
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-eu-trade/u-s-trade-talks-in-
deep-freeze-after-trump-win-says-eu-idUSKBN1361UN [https://perma.cc/TBE3-
RFZQ].  
181  See generally RAFAEL LEAL-ARCAS et al., INTERNATIONAL ENERGY 
GOVERNANCE: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES (2014) (reviewing the timelines of the Trans-
atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Trans-Pacific Partnership and 
their impact on promoting sustainable development); LEAL-ARCAS, supra note 24 
(reviewing different multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade agreements and 
their impact on energy trade); see also WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, MEGA-REGIONAL 
TRADE AGREEMENTS GAME-CHANGERS OR COSTLY DISTRACTIONS FOR THE WORLD 
TRADING SYSTEM? (July 2014), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC/2014/WEF_GAC_TradeFDI_MegaRegio
nalTradeAgreements_Report_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9SG-82T3] (detailing 
the key issues, impact, and potential responses to mega regional trade agreements 
such as TPP and TTIP).   
182  For analysis of the link between regional trade agreements (RTAs) and 
the WTO, see Rafael Leal-Arcas, Proliferation of Regional Trade Agreements: Comple-
menting or Supplanting Multilateralism?, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 597 (2011).   
183  See Rafael Leal-Arcas, Brexit and the Future of UK Trade, QUEEN MARY 
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON (Nov. 25, 2016) 
http://www.qmul.ac.uk/media/news/items/hss/190227.html 
[https://perma.cc/AS3M-VPQM] (discussing how the fallout of Brexit extends 
past trade agreements and what future trade agreements between the UK and the 
EU may look like).   
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regional agreements are also the main GHG emitters, and since 
RTAs have provisions that bind countries to mitigate climate 
change, then RTAs may potentially become a very effective solu-
tion to climate change mitigation and the promotion of clean ener-
gy.184  In addition, one can think of even multilateralizing RTAs.185   
Multilateralism might be the best way forward in terms of legal 
certainty, predictability, and transparency.  The second-best option 
seems to be regionalism/plurilateralism.   
 
8.  OUTLOOK 
 
There is still much to do about how the trading system can 
support clean energy and climate action.  Investing in renewable 
energy makes economic sense, not just environmental sense, given 
that solar energy is the fastest growing energy source.  There are 
obvious social and economic benefits in renewable energy in gen-
eral and solar energy in particular.  Renewables can provide ener-
gy for all.  They can increase the quality of health by reducing the 
level of pollution.186  They can be scalable:  citizens can decide what 
type of energy they want (micro-grids or big solar panels).  Re-
newables can enable students to study where there is not light after 
dark.  The key drive of solar energy is its business case:  the price 
has dropped dramatically in recent years.  For renewable energy to 
be produced at large scale, international cooperation will be neces-
                                                   
184  The same argument applies to sustainable energy.  See generally Rafael 
Leal-Arcas et al., Renewables, Preferential Trade Agreements and EU Energy Security, 4 
LAWS 472 (2015) (discussing how the rise of renewable energy would lead to an 
increase in international trade in energy and exploring the role of preferential 
trade agreements in such a market).   
185  See generally Joost Pauwelyn, Legal Avenues to Multilateralizing Regionalism: 
Beyond Article XXIV, in RICHARD BALDWIN AND PATRICK LOW, MULTILATERALIZING 
REGIONALISM: CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 368 (2009) (exploring 
how regional trade agreements can legally be multilaterized through balancing 
dispute settlement systems of RTAs and the WTO); Richard Baldwin, Multilateral-
ising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12545, 2006), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12545 [https://perma.cc/S9KJ-HHWV] (ex-
plaining how the multilateralization of regionalism is necessary to achieve a glob-
al free trade economy).   
186  For views on the negative impact of GHG emissions on human health due 
to air pollution, see WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, AIR POLLUTION, 
www.who.int/airpollution/en/ [https://perma.cc/6HGW-DWVT] (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2018).   
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sary.  One could also have a more decentralized and democratized 
energy system.187   
The role of international trade (agreements) in renewable ener-
gy may be enhanced in the future.  For instance, wind and sun-
shine in northern Europe is not the same as in southern Morocco.  
The price of northern European renewable energy will therefore be 
higher.  International trade will therefore play a major role to re-
duce prices.  For that to happen, free and fair solar trade in the 
global value chain of trade in goods and services is a must.  The 
elimination of trade barriers damaging the global value chain is 
necessary, whether it is local content requirements or fossil fuel 
subsidies,188 as is the promotion of green growth for a sustainable 
future.189  Equally, greater cooperation will be necessary between 
developed countries that possess the solar-energy technology and 
sunshine countries between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of 
Capricorn, who are fortunate to have tremendous solar-energy po-
tential.  All of this will take place with new thinking and innova-
tion, instead of more of the same.   
The reduction of GHG emissions is possible if we switch to 
100% renewable energy and if we stop using fossil fuels in the en-
                                                   
187  For a thorough analysis, see generally Rafael Leal-Arcas et al., Smart Grids 
in the European Union: Assessing Energy Security, Regulation & Social and Ethical 
Considerations, QUEEN MARY SCHOOL OF LAW LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER 263 
(2017), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3062957 [https://perma.cc/7GGS-
AJ38].   
188  For climate change and the elimination of trade barriers, see generally 
Christopher Frey, Tackling Climate Change through the Elimination of Trade Barriers 
for Low-Carbon Goods: Multilateral, Plurilateral and Regional Approaches, in VOLKER 
MAUERHOFER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 449 (2016).  For fossil 
fuel subsidies in the maritime and aviation realms, see Michael Keen et al., The 
(Non-) Taxation of International Aviation and Maritime fuels: Anomalies and Possibili-
ties, VOX (Sept. 9, 2014), http://voxeu.org/article/non-taxation-international-
aviation-and-maritime-fuels-anomalies-and-possibilities 
[https://perma.cc/4YWV-PMXX].   
189  See, e.g., BELT AND ROAD PORTAL, GUIDANCE ON PROMOTING GREEN BELT 
AND ROAD (May 8, 2017),  https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/12479.htm 
[https://perma.cc/KY6Y-TXRC] (providing the sustainability views and explain-
ing the policy of the Chinese Communist Party regarding the Belt and Road Initia-
tive).  See also Brian Parkin, China Assumes Green Power Mantle, Leaving Germany, 
U.S. Behind, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 5 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-05/china-assumes-green-
power-mantle-leaving-germany-u-s-behind (summarizing a report commissioned 
by the German government published by the Federal Environmental Office show-
ing an increase in Chinese exports of environmental goods and services and de-
tailing the impact of this shift on climate change and the global economy).  
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ergy sector, transportation and agriculture.190  Green buildings, re-
forestation of large areas, and organic agriculture will be necessary 
elements to reach this goal.  To all this, one should add the en-
gagement the US, the EU, and China (as the major GHG emitters), 
helping navigate the transition to renewable energy, and the pro-
motion of carbon pricing.   
 
                                                   
190  See generally Hsin Huang et al., Climate Change and Trade in Agriculture, 36 
FOOD POL’Y S9 (2011).  
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